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Industrialization and Development in Kenya: The Case of Export Processing Zones 
By Dustin Martin 
Abstract 
The lack of industrialization in Sub-Saharan Africa (SS A) is a significant 
challenge that needs to be addressed in order to achieve long-term sustainable growth and 
development in the region. Few countries in the world have made significant progress in 
social and economic development without implementing an effective industrial strategy. 
Many countries in SSA have created Export Processing Zones (EPZs) in an attempt to 
address the challenge of industrialization and foster an export oriented manufacturing 
sector. The Kenyan government's stated objectives of EPZs are to create jobs, diversify 
and expand exports, increase productive investments, foster technology transfer and 
create backward linkages between the zones and the domestic economy. This thesis uses 
the case of EPZs in Kenya to determine if they are meeting these objectives. The thesis 
argues that in its current form the EPZ program in Kenya is failing to achieve the 
objectives that it was intended to achieve. Data from the Kenyan EPZs from 2002-2009 
shows that there are significant shortcomings in expansion and diversification of exports, 
linkages between domestic and EPZ firms, and stable full-time job creation. The thesis 
concludes by offering some recommendations for a more effective industrial strategy that 
places more emphasis on domestic industry and allows for greater state-led policies to 
meet economic development objectives. 
May 20, 2011 
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Since the 1960s, when many countries in SSA achieved independence, much 
emphasis has been placed on industrialization as a way to achieve economic 
development. Industrialization and economic development are closely linked. There are 
few countries that have achieved significant progress in economic development without 
moving from an agrarian-based economy to an industrial economy. Early development 
scholars argued that few if any poor countries would improve their living conditions 
without industrializing; in 1955 Hollis Chenery, a renowned development scholar, wrote 
that, "Industrialization is the main hope of most poor countries trying to increase their 
levels of income" (Chenery 1955: 40). Today most development experts would still agree 
with Chenery. Although there are contested notions of development, some of the most 
widely accepted development indicators such as life expectancy, infant mortality, literacy 
levels, and per-capita income generally improve as a country industrializes. The most 
'developed' countries, according to development indicators such as the human 
development index (HDI), have at some point gone through a process of significant 
industrialization. 
With the exception of South Africa and Zimbabwe, the majority of countries in 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) have struggled to achieve significant levels of 
industrialization. It is one of the greatest development challenges in the region. In 2005 
SSA accounted for 0.7% of global value-added manufacturing and excluding South 
Africa it accounted for only 0.3% of global value-added manufacturing (UNIDO 2009: 
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Table 9.1). Many countries in the region have instituted various policies to try to spur 
industrialization; the creation of EPZs is one such policy implemented by a number of 
countries in SSA. Currently there are over 90 EPZ's in Sub-Saharan Africa, employing 
over 800,000 people (ILO 2007). 
The government of Kenya promotes Export Processing Zones (EPZs) as a key 
tool in meeting economic development objectives. The government suggests that EPZs 
will improve economic development outcomes by increasing the export of manufactured 
goods, creating a larger value-added domestic manufacturing industry, and increasing 
formal sector employment. The government of Kenya has made EPZs, and their planned 
transition into Special Economic Zones (SEZs), a central component of its development 
strategy to make Kenya a middle-income country by the year 2030. The rationale for 
creating EPZs is that it will attract foreign direct investment (FDI) due to generous tax 
breaks, competitive labour costs, and other incentives. According to the EPZ supporters, 
the foreign investors will initially produce labour intensive goods for export and stimulate 
the domestic manufacturing sector by using domestic inputs; eventually the EPZs will 
transition into producing higher value and more capital intensive goods as the labour 
force becomes more productive. Furthermore, the government suggests that domestic 
manufacturers will become more efficient and sophisticated by their exposure to 
manufacturing techniques in the EPZ. 
However, development scholars, trade unionists, and civil society organizations 
criticize the effectiveness of EPZs in meeting development objectives. One of the central 
arguments used in contesting EPZs is that FDI in EPZs will relocate to a lower cost 
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country with more generous incentives and cheaper labour when the opportunity presents 
itself, effectively nullifying the objective of increasing value-added exports. Another 
argument against EPZs, on a more structural level, is that the export-oriented design of 
EPZs is incapable of stimulating the domestic manufacturing sector to play a greater role 
in meeting domestic needs and reducing reliance on imports because the inputs are not 
locally produced. From a labour perspective, the EPZ model is criticized by trade unions 
and labour rights organizations for creating poor quality jobs that pay low wages and are 
often insecure because the goods that are produced require little skill and are labour 
intensive. Given these critiques, this thesis will attempt to determine if Kenyan EPZs are 
leading to a form of industrialization that will meet domestic needs by increasing and 
diversifying exports, strengthening domestic manufacturers through backward linkages, 
and creating full-time formal sector employment. 
Literature Review 
This section of the thesis examines a variety of literature in an effort to determine 
which models of industrialization have been most successful in meeting the objectives of 
increased exports and diversification of manufactured products, strengthening of the 
domestic manufacturing sector, and increased and better quality employment in the 
formal sector. There is no standard model of industrialization that is suitable for all 
countries, but there are some general concepts, based on the experience of other recently 
industrialized developing countries, that are useful for developing countries seeking to 
implement an effective industrialization strategy. 
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The first industrialization model that will be analyzed is Import Substituting 
Industrialization (ISI). The second industrialization model that will be examined is 
Export Oriented Industrialization (EOI). The purpose of analyzing these two 
industrialization strategies is that they have both been implemented in a variety of 
developing countries with varying degrees of success and these theories have directly 
influenced the debate on the development potential of EPZs. 
In addition to analyzing ISI and EOI, the literature review also explores the 
industrialization strategies associated with the developmental state model of the Newly 
Industrializing Countries (NICs) such as South Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. These 
countries have achieved many of the industrialization objectives that are being evaluated 
in this thesis and therefore offer useful insights into industrial strategies for developing 
countries. 
The literature review also discusses EPZs and their impact on economic 
development in terms of exports, linkages with domestic firms, and job creation. The 
literature in this section consists of previous research conducted on EPZs in various 
countries. 
Finally, theories on labour and development will be examined and discussed. 
Specific emphasis is placed on the influence of changes in approaches to industrial 
development and how this has affected labour in developing countries. This section is 
particularly relevant to EPZs because employment creation is one of the central 
objectives of governments when they implement EPZ programs. 
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The overall objective of this literature review is to offer a useful analytical 
framework for interpreting the empirical data in this thesis with regards to EPZs in Kenya 
and their role in industrialization. 
Industrialization and Development 
Import Substitution Industrialization 
The concept of Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) grew out of a school of 
development theory that was popularized in the 1950s and 1960s by a group of scholars 
known as structuralists and a subsequent group of scholars that built on this work known 
as neo-structuralists, which included those in the dependency school. The early 
structuralist theorists, such as Raul Prebisch and Hans Singer believed that 
underdeveloped economies remained underdeveloped because the domestic 
manufacturing sector was very small compared to the traditional sector. The traditional 
sector was defined as smallholder labour-intensive farming as well as artisanal 
craftsmanship. The imbalance between the traditional sector and the modern industrial 
sector resulted in a domestic market with weak purchasing power because wages in the 
traditional sector were far lower than that of the manufacturing sector (Martinussen 1997: 
74). Furthermore, Prebisch and Singer suggested that there was deterioration in the terms 
of trade between countries in Latin America, Africa, and Asia and countries in North 
America and Europe; this idea would become known as the 'Prebisch-Singer Hypothesis' 
(Kay 2006: 202). 
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The deterioration in the terms of trade was due to that fact that underdeveloped 
countries sell their commodities to industrialized countries and then must buy 
manufactured products back from the industrialized countries at a much higher price than 
what the raw materials making up those products are worth. Furthermore, decreases in 
commodity prices are not matched by a commensurate decrease in the cost of 
manufactured goods. Stated differently, commodity prices are far more elastic than the 
price of manufactured goods. Hence, the terms of trade are in a steady state of 
deterioration regardless of the price of commodities. Because of this steady decline in the 
terms of trade, it becomes more difficult to purchase inputs needed for industrialization. 
In addition, the wages in commodity-based industries are much lower than those in the 
manufacturing industry, making it difficult for the growth of a large domestic market 
with enough income to support a domestic manufacturing sector. Prebisch believed that 
there needed to be a comprehensive change in this unbalanced system of production. He 
stated, "It is very important to recognize the need for such structural changes in the 
composition of production in order to remedy the trend toward external disequilibrium 
that normally makes itself keenly felt in balance-of-payments crises" (Prebisch 1981: 
567). Hans Singer also arrived at the same conclusion in his study of development, even 
though he was working independently from Prebisch. In his book International 
Development: Growth and Change Singer states that, 
All the evidence is that productivity has increased if anything less fast in 
the production of food and raw materials, even in the industrialized 
countries but most certainly in the underdeveloped countries, than has 
productivity in the manufacturing industries of the industrialized countries 
(1964: 165-166). 
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The structuralists believed that the necessary solution to the problem of uneven terms of 
trade was for the government to help stimulate domestic manufacturing. One of the key 
policies put forward by Prebisch and Singer to help stimulate domestic manufacturing 
was ISI. 
ISI was a policy that was put forward by the UN Economic Commission for Latin 
America (ECLA) of which Prebisch was the Executive Secretary from 1950-1962 (Kay 
2006: 200). Werner Baer lays out the principal policy instruments for ISI: 
Protective tariffs and/or exchange controls; special preferences for 
domestic and foreign firms importing capital goods for new industries; 
preferential import exchange rates for industrial raw materials, fuels and 
intermediate goods; cheap loans by government development banks for 
favored industries; the construction by governments of infrastructure 
especially designed to complement industries; and the direct participation 
of government in certain industries, especially the heavier industries, such 
as steel, where neither domestic nor foreign private capital was willing or 
able to invest (1972: 98). 
Industrialization under this model has three main components to be undertaken in 
successive stages. The first stage of ISI is the development of domestic manufacturing in 
light goods such as building materials. The second stage of ISI is the manufacturing of 
more complex products such as consumer goods. The third and final stage in this model 
is the creation of a manufacturing industry in heavy goods such as steel, automobiles, and 
other complex highly engineered products. 
There were several factors that led to the popularization of ISI in much of the 
developing world in the 1960s and 1970s. In Latin America ISI was popularized partly as 
a result of the many prominent Latin American structuralist and dependentista scholars 
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that held influential posts in various governments, as well as bodies such as the ECLA. 
The popularization of IS I in Latin America in the 1960s also coincided with the liberation 
of many African countries from their colonizers. This provided fertile ground for 
structuralist and dependency theories to take root in the form of ISI throughout much of 
Sub-Saharan Africa as the newly independent countries sought to reduce their reliance on 
their former colonial masters both politically and economically. However, not all 
countries employing the ISI model achieved the same degree of success in 
industrialization; as a result, there is much debate about the effectiveness of ISI as a 
development strategy. 
Many developing countries, particularly in Latin America as well as a few in 
Africa, including Kenya, experienced high GDP growth and a significant increase in 
manufacturing output in the 1960s and 1970s while using a variety of state interventionist 
policies in the market to spur industrialization. Such policies included cheap state-funded 
credit for domestic manufacturers, raising tariffs to prevent cheap imports from 
competing with domestic manufacturers, and investing heavily in large state-owned 
infrastructural projects such as roads, power generation, educational facilities, seaports, 
and airports. Despite the growth in GDP and in domestic manufacturing, there has been 
debate about the effectiveness and sustainability of the ISI strategy. 
Currently, the dominant historical narrative of ISI is that it was a failure because it 
compounded the balance-of-payment crises of the 1970s due to the need to import 
expensive machinery used in the state-supported heavy manufacturing industries. 
Furthermore, critics argue that developing countries should not pursue state-led 
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industrialization such as ISI because it distorts markets and creates an inefficient 
manufacturing sector that is unable to compete on world markets. Jagdish Bhagwati, a 
renowned neo-classical economist, heavily criticizes ISI in his book Anatomy and 
Consequences of Exchange Control Regimes. Bhagwati suggest that an export-
promoting strategy is a superior approach to development than ISI. He writes that, 
One cannot suppress the thought that the success stories of South Korea, 
Taiwan, Brazil, Singapore, and Hong Kong would not have been quite so 
impressive if they had not been built partly on the failures of the countries 
sticking overly long to the IS [Import Substitution] strategy and their 
consequent export (and associated economic) lag (216). 
Other neo-classical economists have adopted a similar view of ISI and often use the same 
countries as Bhagwati (South Korea, Taiwan, Brazil, Singapore, Hong Kong) as 
examples of the superiority of Export Oriented Industrialization (EOI) over ISI. 
Furthermore, neo-classical economists believe that the state should take a less 
interventionist role in the economy and instead act to ease the flow of goods, services, 
and capital across borders, as well as focusing on controlling inflation and investing in 
infrastructure that supports the growth of private capital. A more in depth analysis of EOI 
and neo-classical economics will be discussed in the next section of this literature review. 
Despite the criticisms of ISI, other development theorists suggest that the reason 
the Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs), such as the ones mentioned above, 
successfully industrialized was not because they abandoned ISI but because they 
implemented state-led industrialization in the first place. 
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Ha-Joon Chang argues that no country has successfully industrialized without 
using some type of state-led interventionist policy and attributes the industrial success of 
the Asian NICs to ISI and other state interventions (Chang 2006: 2). Chang bases much 
of his argument on the development experience of South Korea from the end of the 
Korean War to the present whereby Korea went from being one of the poorest countries 
in the world to being on par with Portugal; life expectancy increased by over 20 years 
during this period, and infant mortality dropped from 78 out of 1000 births to only 5 out 
of 1000 (Chang 2007: 12). Chang states that during this era, particularly between the 
1960s and the 1980s, South Korea nurtured certain industries through tariff protection, 
subsidies, bank ownership to provide cheap credit, and other government supports until 
they were mature enough to compete with international competition (Ibid: 14). In 
addition Chang states that, 
Some big projects were undertaken directly by state-owned enterprises -
the steel maker, POSCO, being the best example - although the country 
had a pragmatic, rather than ideological, attitude to the issue of state 
ownership. If private enterprises worked well, that was fine; if they did not 
invest in important areas, the government had no qualms about setting up 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs); and if some enterprises were 
mismanaged, the government often took them over, restructured them, and 
usually (but not always) sold them off again (ibid.). 
To be sure, there needs to be a greater recognition of the role that state-led 
industrialization policies played in South Korea and other NICs. 
However, the success of the state-led industrialization policies in the NICs does 
not fully discount the critiques of ISI that were mentioned earlier. For example, the 
balance of payments crisis in the 1970s, faced by many developing countries including 
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Kenya, was partly due to the fact that countries were importing expensive machinery for 
heavy industries. Nonetheless, there were also other major factors contributing to the 
balance of payments problem such as the oil crisis, a worldwide economic slowdown, 
and a deterioration in commodity prices which many developing countries depended on 
to maintain their foreign currency reserves. The dominant historical narrative of ISI often 
overlooks the importance of these latter factors in order to delegitirnize the state-led 
model of industrialization and strengthen the argument for neo-liberal industrialization 
policies. The marked turn from ISI towards EOI in the late 1970s and early 1980s is 
deeply intertwined with a paradigmatic shift in development thinking from state-led 
development towards market-led development. 
Export Oriented Industrialization (EOI) 
The practice of manufacturing goods for export has been around as long as 
humans have produced and traded goods. The emphasis in this section is not to analyze 
the historical role of manufacturing for export in its entirety, but rather to examine the 
change in development thinking in the 1970s from the emphasis on state-led 
industrialization to market-led industrialization, as well as a policy shift from import 
substitution to export promotion. This shift in development policy is significant because 
it embodies a change not only in industrialization thinking but also in the overall 
ideological approach to economic development. 
Underpinning the change in industrialization policy was a greater commitment to 
neo-classical economic theory by scholars, Western governments, and international 
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financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
The neo-classical critique of industrialization policies in developing countries was that 
government interventions had hindered the operation of markets and led to an 
economically inefficient form of industrialization (Weiss 1988: 171). Furthermore, the 
critique suggested that industrialization policies had reduced export growth and ignored 
specialization on the basis of comparative advantage because developing countries were 
trying to produce goods that could be produced more efficiently elsewhere (ibid.). 
As mentioned earlier, Jagdish Bhagwati, a neo-classical economist, wrote 
extensively on the need for developing countries to abandon ISI and adopt EOI policies. 
Other scholars and economists were also influential in changing the development 
paradigm by extolling the virtues of EOI and criticizing the ISI model and the 'export 
pessimists' as Bhagwati and others categorize the earlier structuralist theorists (Bhagwati 
1988: 27). Some of the most well known supporters of EOI are economists and scholars 
such as Bela Balassa, Juergen Donges, Anne Krueger, and Ian Little, among others. Each 
of these authors uses slightly different data and case studies to support his or her 
argument, but they generally agree that economic growth is highest in countries that 
pursue EOI and lower in countries that attempt to protect their domestic manufacturers 
through the use of tariffs, subsidies, and other import discriminating policy tools. 
This group of scholars also exerted tremendous influence in powerful 
development institutions. For example, Jagdish Bhagwati consulted for various 
international organizations such as the United Nations and the World Trade Organization, 
Bela Balassa was a consultant with the World Bank, and Anne Krueger became the chief 
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economist for the World Bank from 1982 to 1986 (World Bank 201 la); Ian Little 
published his findings for the Development Centre of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (Little, Scitovsky, & Scott 1970). The influence of these 
scholars, and others sharing the same views, on governments and influential international 
organizations had a marked impact on the industrialization policies of LDCs. The 'free 
market' operating without government interference was becoming the new saviour that 
would transform developing countries into modern industrial societies. 
However, it is too simplistic to suggest that everyone that supported EOI was also 
committed to neo-classical economics or that they all believed that the government 
should never intervene in the market. Among those who supported EOI there was still 
debate about the role that the state should play and there were cases made for varying 
degrees of state intervention. These debates will be explored more fully in the following 
section. 
Ian Little was one of the earliest and most influential scholars to promote an EOI 
strategy for developing countries. One of his most influential works was a book, Industry 
and Trade in Some Developing Countries, co-authored with Tibor Scitovsky and Maurice 
Scott, which analyzed industrialization policies in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, India, 
Pakistan, Taiwan, and the Philippines (Little, Scitovsky, & Scott 1970). Generally, Little, 
Scitovsky, and Scott conclude that countries that pursued open trade and reduced tariffs 
and protection for domestic industries experienced the highest economic growth. Little, 
Scitovsky, and Scott suggest that there is a virtuous cycle between free trade and growth: 
"Growth encourages measures to free trade which, in turn, encourage growth" (Ibid: 
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390). The idea of a virtuous cycle of free trade and growth would eventually become a 
mantra repeated in the 1980s by the World Bank and Western governments in their 
adoption of neo-liberal policies and structural adjustment policies imposed on developing 
countries.1 
Bela Balassa undertook a similar study on EOI and makes an argument very 
similar to Little, Scitovsky, and Scott. In support of EOI, Balassa states that, 
[Export-oriented policies] lead to resource allocation according to 
comparative advantage, allow for greater capacity utilization, permit the 
exploitation of economies of scale, generate technological improvements 
in response to competition abroad and, in labor-surplus countries, 
contribute to increased employment (1978: 181). 
Balassa supports this claim in the same paper by examining growth rates in South Korea, 
Singapore, and Taiwan (countries with export-oriented policies according to Balassa) and 
compares them with the growth rates in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico 
(countries that used import substitution to a greater degree and adopted export-oriented 
policies later than the first group of countries) (ibid.: 183). Balassa uses data to make the 
connection between increased export growth and an increase in gross national product 
(GNP). In general Balassa's data show that countries with the highest increases in 
exports, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan, also experienced the greatest growth in 
1 Structural adjustment policies were policies put in place by the World Bank, IMF, and developed 
countries that gave loans and funding to developing countries on the condition that they reduced import 
tariffs, cut subsidies for domestic manufacturers, privatized state-owned industries, and privatized public 
services. For a more thorough analysis of structural adjustment policies in Africa see African Voices on 
Structural Adjustment (2003). 
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GNP. The data lead Balassa to the conclusion that EOI policies are more beneficial for 
economic growth in developing countries than import substitution policies (ibid: 188). 
In a similar study, Juergen B. Donges reviews industrialization policies in fifteen 
semi-industrial countries from the 1950s to the mid-1970s (Donges 1976). Donges 
reaches essentially the same conclusion as Balassa by suggesting that the countries 
pursuing EOI had the fastest rates of growth and uses Hong Kong and Singapore as the 
standard of reference (ibid.: 655). His recommendation is that other developing countries 
pursue similar policies of export promotion and reduce their protection for domestic 
manufacturers by lowering import tariffs. 
However, Donges does not completely dismiss the usefulness of import-
substitution policies; he suggests that manufacturing for a domestic market should be 
pursued only in sectors that are efficient and offer a long-term competitive advantage 
over imports. Donges suggests that instead of protecting domestic industries through 
tariffs, LDCs would be better served by direct subsidies through the 'infant industry' 
stage until they become more competitive. The direct subsidy would be more beneficial 
than an import tariff because it would improve production for both the domestic and 
export markets. Donges believes that tariffs, used in past ISI policies, were an inferior 
policy because they overvalued domestic currencies because of restrictions on imports; 
the overvaluation made exports more expensive and therefore less competitive. 
Furthermore, Donges contends that resources were being wasted on producing 
'inessential' goods that were restricted from importation at the expense of producing 
essential goods; this made the use of resources more inefficient (Ibid.: 636-37). Overall 
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Donges believes that protectionist import-substituting policies favoured industries that 
were less efficient and/or less essential and this was a drag on the economy because it 
retarded productivity (Ibid.: 636). 
Anne Krueger joins Balassa and Donges in her support for export promotion in 
developing countries. Her argument follows the same rationale as the other authors by 
stating that developing countries that experienced the highest growth in GNP also 
pursued export-promotion policies (Krueger 1980: 289). Krueger analyzes three 
hypotheses that attempt to explain why export-promotion is a superior policy to import-
substitution in achieving higher rates of economic growth. The first hypothesis is that 
export promotion allows the construction of manufacturing plants that are of a minimum 
efficient size because they can produce for a larger market and this allows for increasing 
returns to scale; the plants are also run more efficiently because they are required to 
compete in the international market (Ibid.: 289). 
The second hypothesis is that import substitution policies were flawed in their 
implementation; this hypothesis does not fully discount import substitution in its entirety, 
but rather the aspects that were hindering productivity and leading to market distortions. 
An example given to support the lack of productivity was that import substitution policies 
rewarded entrepreneurs for license-getting abilities as opposed to productivity 
improvements (Ibid.: 291). The hypothesis also suggests that import substitution became 
more focused on foreign exchange saving instead of developing new industries (Ibid: 
291). 
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The third hypothesis that Krueger examines suggests that economic growth would 
be optimal in the absence of intervention regardless of whether this intervention was 
intended to support import substitution or export promotion (Ibid.: 291). This hypothesis 
argues that export promotion is superior to import substitution but any intervention 
supporting export promotion, whether it is a tariff, subsidy, exchange control, licensing, 
or other intervention in support of export promotion, would essentially distort the market. 
She states, "The commitment to an export-oriented development strategy implies a fairly 
liberal and efficient trade regime, and thus prevents paperwork, delays, bureaucratic 
regulation, and other costs that can arise under import substitution. This in turn limits the 
restrictions that can be imposed on capital account" (Ibid: 291). This hypothesis 
presented by Krueger forms the backbone of the argument used to implement neo-
classical economic reforms both in the developing and developed world. However, an 
important aspect of this hypothesis that needs to be emphasized is that this 'hands-off 
approach to economic development and export promotion works best if all countries 
adopt the same approach and reduce barriers to trade; this is one of the key tenets of free-
market capitalism. Krueger also makes note of this stating, "It is, of course, to be hoped 
that protectionist pressures in the developed countries do not result in fewer opportunities 
for the LDCs [less developed countries]. If such protectionist measures are taken, they 
will lower the rate of return to outward-oriented trade strategies" (Ibid: 292). 
Krueger suggests that all three hypotheses have some element of truth, but that 
none of the hypotheses on their own can fully account for differences in economic 
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performance between import substitution and export promotion (Ibid.: 292). However, 
Krueger maintains that EOI is superior to ISI in pursuing economic growth. 
The most popular arguments for the implementation of EOI have supported pro-
market and non-state interventionist policies. However, there has been considerable 
debate about the degree and manner in which governments should be involved in export 
promotion. There are also critiques that question whether all forms of protection for 
domestic manufacturers should be eliminated as many neo-classical theorists suggest. 
Within EOI theory there is a diversity of views with regard to the level of state 
intervention for the support of export manufacturing. On one side of the spectrum is the 
neo-classical school of thought that believes the role of the state in relation to industrial 
policy should be limited to maintaining macro-economic stability by way of setting 
interest rates to control inflation and making the tax system stable and simple, providing 
a free and flexible capital market without sectoral protection, limiting the power of 
monopolies, building and maintaining infrastructure such as roads and ports to facilitate 
more efficient trade, providing education to provide a more productive workforce, and 
maintaining political and economic stability to attract foreign direct investment (Corden 
1980: 182-83). However, according to the neo-classical approach, direct interventions in 
the market by the state through subsidy or tariff protection are to be avoided. This 
approach to industrialization became the dominant view of the large international 
financial institutions, as detailed in the previous section. The supporters of the neo-
classical approach to export promotion include those mentioned earlier such as Balassa, 
Bhagwati, Donges, Krueger, Little, Scitovsky, and Scott. 
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On the other side of the spectrum there are export-promoters that believe the state 
has an important role to play by directly intervening in the market through a variety of 
methods including but not limited to export subsidies, cheap credit, and in some cases 
nationalization of certain firms or industries. This approach was supported by many of 
the early structuralists and dependency theorists that are generally associated with ISI and 
inward-oriented industrialization. These 'export pessimists', as Baghwati labels them, 
were not necessarily anti-export but were more concerned about what was being exported 
in relation to what they were importing. They also believed that it was necessary for the 
state to intervene in the market in order to encourage the development of higher value 
manufacturing, regardless of whether the products were for the domestic market or for 
export. This is a key distinction that is often missed when ISI is compared to EOI. 
With regard to state protections for domestic industries, neo-classical economists 
are criticized for wrongly associating state protection (tariff and non-tariff trade barriers) 
of domestic industries with hindering economic growth. For example, Francisco 
Rodriguez and Dani Rodrik, in a study on trade policy and economic growth, state that, 
"if there is an inverse relationship between trade barriers and economic growth, it is not 
one that immediately stands out in the data" (Rodriguez and Rodrik 2001: 262). Their 
claim is based on an analysis of a number of countries from 1975-1994 that compares 
tariff and non-tariff trade barriers and economic growth in terms of per-capita GDP 
between these countries. The study shows no statistical significance between trade 
barriers and economic growth: 
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The figures show the relationship between these measures and growth 
after controlling for levels of initial income and secondary education. In 
both cases, the slope of the relationship is only slightly negative and 
nowhere near statistical significance. This finding is not atypical. Simple 
measures of trade barriers tend not to enter significantly in well-specified 
growth regressions, regardless of time periods, subsamples, or the 
conditioning variables employed (Ibid.). 
Rodriguez and Rodrik do not dispute that some trade liberalization may be beneficial but 
they conclude their study by saying that, "What we dispute is the view, increasingly 
common, that integration into the world economy is such a potent force for economic 
growth that it can effectively substitute for a development strategy" (Ibid.:318). The NICs 
are often used by neo-classical economists as an example of the success of trade 
liberalization to promote industrialization and achieve economic development objectives. 
However, a closer examination of this model suggests that the governments of the NICs 
used a mixture of market-led and state-led policies to achieve successful industrialization 
objectives. 
The Developmental State 
The developmental state model as practiced in NICs such as South Korea, 
Taiwan, and Hong Kong employed both ISI policies and EOI policies using a 
combination of state support, and in some cases state protection, as well as private FDI. 
Understanding this model of industrialization is necessary because it provides important 
insights into the way in which effective industrial strategies can help achieve economic 
development objectives in developing countries. The significant growth of the East Asian 
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economies has generated plenty of debate among those that have sought to explain the 
reasons for this growth. John Martinussen provides a useful typology of approaches that 
are used to interpret the conditions for growth in the NICs; according to Martinussen, the 
approaches consist of the pure neo-classical economics view, the revisionist view, and the 
functional approach (1997: 269). The neo-classical view is employed by economists such 
as Jagdish Bhagwati, Edward Chen, and Charles Wolf; the revisionist view is used by 
scholars such as Alice Amsden, Ha-Joon Chang, and Robert Wade; and the functional 
approach is used by the World Bank (Ibid.). An evaluation of these three approaches will 
be undertaken to determine which one is the most useful in explaining the 
industrialization success of the NICs. Furthermore, understanding the approach that best 
interprets the industrialization process in the NICs will offer some useful implications for 
industrialization in Kenya. 
The pure neo-classical view became popular in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
This view attributed most of the success of the NICs to non-intervention by the state in 
price formation, foreign trade, and the economic functioning of private enterprises (Ibid.). 
Additionally, the supporters of this view suggest that much of the success of the NICs is 
due to a stable macro-economic framework, openness to free trade, and government 
investment in health and education. For example, Edward Chen, in his study of economic 
growth in Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan suggests that the industrial 
success of these countries is due to a number of factors that are adhere to neo-classical 
economic theory. First of all, Chen states that these economies allocate resources 
efficiently because they are free of government interference: 
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What the State has provided is simply a suitable environment for the 
entrepreneurs to perform their functions. In Hong Kong, Japan, and 
Singapore, institutional and historical factors have resulted in a free-
enterprise environment in which entrepreneurs can work with maximum 
flexibility. In Korea and Taiwan, the 'correct' environment for 
entrepreneurs has developed as a result of various changes in the monetary 
system, the correction of the over-valued foreign exchange rate, and the 
relaxation of restrictions on foreign trade. These measures had the effect 
of removing impediments to the working of the price mechanism (1979: 
183-84). 
The argument made by Chen is that the government provided a stable macro-economic 
framework free of price distorting interventions that allowed private capital to flourish. 
Additionally, Chen states that high savings rates were achieved in these economies 
"without direct government intervention" (Ibid.). He suggests that the high savings rates 
"were due to the thriftiness of the people and partly due to the abundant supply of 
entrepreneurs who are normally the important savers" (Ibid.). Finally, Chen argues that 
the countries under study achieved export-led growth by removing impediments to the 
functioning of free markets, allowing investment into labour-intensive manufacturing in 
which the countries had a comparative advantage (Ibid.: 185). 
Chen's interpretation of the NIC's development success was echoed by other 
economists such as Jagdish Bhagwati (1988) and Charles Wolf (1988) and generally 
became accepted as the 'correct' approach in interpreting the economic success of the 
East Asian economies. However, revisionists, such as Alice Amsden, Ha-Joon Chang, 
and Robert Went, began challenging 
the neo-classical economics interpretation in the late 1980s, and took issue with many of 
the main arguments used to support the neo-classical approach. 
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Robert Wade used the example of Taiwan to suggest that the country had a long 
history of state-led industrialization dating back to the 1950s that was largely responsible 
for the growth in the industrial sector (1990). Wade argues that the neo-classical 
interpretation gives insufficient weight to the role of the state, especially during the 
transition from inward oriented industrialization to export oriented industrialization (Ibid: 
109). Wade suggests that the state directed resources into industries important for future 
growth by using import substitutes in export production for products like synthetic fibres, 
plastics, and electronics (Ibid.: 110). He adds that, "Multinational companies became 
important players in these [industrial] developments, but only after the state had a well-
established presence and leadership position from which it could channel their activities 
rather than be made subordinate to a logic of global profits (Ibid.). This interpretation of 
industrial development is contrary to Chen's argument that the state merely provided an 
enabling environment for entrepreneurs to invest in new industries without direct state 
support. 
Alice Amsden comes to the same conclusion as Wade in her analysis of industrial 
policies in several developing countries including NICs.2 Amsden suggests that it was the 
ability of import substitution policies to transform manufactures for the domestic market 
into manufactures for the export market. She states that, 
Whatever the country, capital formation and exporting were intermediated 
by import substitution. Virtually every manufactured export, save the most 
2 According to Amsden the Newly Industrializing Countries or 'the rest' as she labels them are comprised 
of, "China, India, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Thailand in Asia; Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, and Mexico in Latin America; and Turkey in the Middle East" (Amsden 2001: 1). 
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labor-intensive (apparel and software), emerged out of an import 
substitution industry. The superprofits earned through selling in the 
protected domestic market helped to finance the learning and scaled 
economies necessary to export (Amsden 2001: 188). 
In her analysis of the late industrializing countries, Amsden finds that there was a variety 
of interventionist policies used to promote exports. These policies include direct subsidies 
of exports such as tax breaks and duty drawbacks on imports, long-term state subsidized 
loans, tariff protection, and local content requirement for foreign firms setting up 
manufacturing plants, particularly in the auto sector (Ibid.: 148-154; see also Chang 
2006, 2007). 
The revisionist interpretation of the industrial success of the emerging East Asian 
economies represented a significant departure from the previous neo-classical economics 
interpretation. This revisionist interpretation forced mainstream development institutions 
such as the World Bank to re-evaluate their own interpretation of the policies that 
contributed the industrial ascendancy of these countries. Interestingly, this came at a time 
when the World Bank, IMF, and Western countries were forcing developing countries to 
adopt neo-classical economic policies through structural adjustment programs and 
conditional lending. A full admission by the World Bank that state-led intervention was 
an important factor in the successful industrialization process in East Asia would appear 
hypocritical as it was forcing developing countries to liberalize their economies and adopt 
neo-classical economic reform. 
The World Bank response to the revisionist interpretation was the publication of a 
comparative study of economic growth and public policy in East Asia called The East 
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Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy (1993). The report admits that 
"some selective interventions contributed to growth" (Ibid.: vi). However, the report 
states that the interventions only succeeded under three conditions: first of all "they 
addressed problems in the functioning of the markets"; secondly, "they took place within 
the context of good, fundamental policies"; thirdly, "their success depended on the ability 
of governments to establish and monitor appropriate economic-performance criteria 
related to the interventions - in the authors' terms, to create economic contests" (Ibid.). 
The World Bank suggests that the interventions are the exception rather than the rule: 
"The authors [of the report] conclude that rapid growth in each economy was primarily 
due to the application of a set of common, market-friendly economic policies, leading to 
both higher accumulation and better allocation of resources" (Ibid.). Although, the World 
Bank continued to emphasize market-led industrial policy as the key factor in the success 
of the NICs, the admission that state intervention, albeit limited, played a role in 
industrialization signaled a significant departure from the World Bank's previous position 
that state intervention had no role in the industrial success of the East Asian economies. 
The World Bank also downplayed any possibility that state interventions, particularly 
protection of domestic industries, could be implemented effectively in other developing 
countries: "We conclude that promotion of specific industries generally did not work and 
therefore holds little promise for other developing economies" (Ibid.: 354). The one state 
intervention the World Bank recommended for other developing countries was export 
promotion or what it terms as an 'export-push strategy'. After categorically rejecting the 
usefulness of state intervention in protecting domestic industries, the World Bank, 
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suggests that export promotion measures such as "export credit, providing tax incentives, 
or improving access for small and medium exporters" (Ibid.: 361) could be useful for 
developing countries trying to establish an export oriented industrial sector. The World 
Bank's recommendation of state involvement in export promotion is of particular 
relevance to the establishment of EPZs because many of the same export promotion 
policies, particularly tax incentives, are used to attract export oriented manufacturing 
firms. 
The various interpretations of the industrialization process in the NICs has 
significant implications for industrial policies of other developing countries. The shaping 
of this debate by neo-classical economists, the revisionists, and the World Bank has 
directly influenced the policies adopted by countries such as Kenya. The view that state-
intervention, especially in the domestic industry, should be avoided in favour of market-
led industrial development has generally prevailed. The government of Kenya has 
adopted this view, although not always willingly, since the 1990s and continuing into the 
current era (this will be explored more fully in Chapter 2). Beeson & Islam (2005) 
suggest that there are often tensions in policy making between appeasing investor 
confidence and serving national interests. They state that, 
When they [nations] gear their entire national development strategy to the 
preferences of and sentiments of global markets - often subsumed under 
the rubric of attracting and sustaining investor confidence - they may be 
forced to shun the voices and concerns of domestic constituencies and the 
strategic directions that a nation ought to take. This inadvertently 
undermines democratic governance and may well cause the tensions 
between domestic stakeholders and foreign constituencies to become 
unmanageable. Under such circumstances, crafting a credible national 
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development strategy becomes rather difficult (Beeson & Islam 2005: 
211). 
Beeson & Islam are commenting specifically on the East Asian development experience 
but the same critique is true for Kenya. The process of economic liberalization that began 
in earnest in the 1990s has done little to improve the performance of Kenya's 
manufacturing sector to date. The adoption of the neoliberal approach in industrialization 
is explicitly linked to the development of EPZs in Kenya. However, it is important to 
note that the prevalence of the World Bank's industrial policy prescriptions in Kenya is 
not without its critics and its interpretation of the industrialization process in East Asia 
remains contested by many. 
Export Processing Zones and Industrialization 
The creation of EPZs is taking place in a number of developing countries in an 
effort to quicken the pace of industrialization. Although there are several different types 
of EPZs, they generally share some of the same basic characteristics; Peter Warr provides 
a useful definition describing some of these characteristics. Generally EPZs are built as, 
Special enclaves, outside a nation's normal customs barriers, within which 
investing firms, mostly foreign, enjoy favoured treatment with respect to 
imports of intermediate goods, company taxation, provision of 
infrastructure and freedom from industrial regulations applying elsewhere 
in the country...A universal feature is the almost complete absence of 
either taxation or regulation of imports of intermediate goods into the 
zones. These privileges are subject to the conditions that almost all of the 
output produced is exported and that all imported intermediate goods are 
utilized fully within the zones or re-exported (Warr 1990: 130). 
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Ireland was the first country to create an EPZ, called the Shannon Free Zone, in 
1958; many developing countries, including Kenya, have adopted a similar model of EPZ 
based on the Shannon Free Zone. 
In the 1950s, Shannon was in a state of economic decline so the government 
embarked on a program to create employment in the area by turning the airport and the 
area around it into an Industrial Free Zone as a site to attract international investment into 
manufacturing for export. The main incentives used to attract investment were duty free 
imports of raw materials and capital equipment and tax exemptions on profits earned 
through export activities (APHD 1986: 34). The Shannon Free Zone was part of a 
broader government strategy to pursue EOI. In the 1960s Ireland signed a free trade 
agreement with Great Britain, which was extended to the European Economic 
Community (EEC) in 1973 when Ireland became a member (Ibid.: 31). Ireland became 
an attractive country for companies to set up manufacturing facilities because of its 
labour cost advantage compared with other Western European countries and its proximity 
to large markets such as Great Britain, France, and Germany (Ibid.: 32). 
However, when lower-wage countries such as Greece, Spain, and Portugal joined 
the EEC, Ireland's cost advantage eroded and it became less advantageous for foreign 
companies to manufacture in Ireland (Ibid.: 32). Furthermore, the Telesis Report of 1982, 
a report on the contribution of foreign firms to industrialization in Ireland, stated that 
foreign firms operating in Ireland used few Irish inputs (backward linkages) and did not 
contribute to long-term sustained increases in employment (Ibid.: 33). 
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The idea of creating EPZs is strongly linked with the export promotion theories 
that were discussed earlier in this section, particularly those that adhere to neo-classical 
economics. At first glance it appears that EPZs subscribe to neo-classical economics 
because they are free from import tariffs and other barriers and regulations that would 
interfere with the free movement of imports and exports. However, EPZs diverge from 
some of the principles of neo-classical economics because exports are given favourable 
treatment, by the state, over production for the domestic market. Some of the incentives 
that diverge from neo-classical economics include subsidized electricity rates for 
manufacturers, subsidized infrastructure, services sold below the market rate to 
manufacturers, and tax exemptions for firms in EPZs not given to domestic 
manufacturers. A true neo-classical economic approach would favour neither 
manufacturing for the domestic market nor manufacturing for export through state 
intervention, because this would distort 'natural' comparative advantages and lead to 
market inefficiencies. 
Regardless of the inconsistencies between EPZs and neo-classical economic 
theory, EPZs are embraced by development theorists, international financial institutions 
(namely the World Bank and the IMF), and developing country governments as a formula 
for industrialization. However, EPZs have also come under criticism from organized 
labour, development scholars, economists from diverse ideological backgrounds, non-
governmental organizations, and other civil society groups both in developed and 
developing countries. 
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The purpose of this section is to analyze the literature from various viewpoints 
with regards to EPZs. I will first analyze the literature on EPZs by neo-classical theorists 
that generally support export promotion but have varying views on the usefulness of 
EPZs. Secondly, I will evaluate the literature written by those that favour protection of 
domestic manufacturing and believe that the state should take a more interventionist role 
to promote manufacturing; more generally this literature adheres or partially adheres to 
IS I strategy. 
The objective of this discussion is not to analyze all of the literature with regards 
to EPZs; an undertaking of such magnitude lies beyond the scope of this thesis. However, 
for the purpose of my research I will focus specifically on the EPZ debate with regard to 
its impact on industrialization and potential for economic development in developing 
countries. 
Export Promotion and Export Promotion Zones 
EPZs, also known as Free Trade Zones or duty free zones, became popular in the 
1960s and 1970s in Asia, and subsequently in Latin America, the Caribbean, and Africa. 
India was the first Asian country to set up an EPZ in 1965, Taiwan established its first 
EPZ in 1966, and South Korea constructed its first in 1970 (Amirahmadi & Wu 1995: 
831). EPZs became more accepted as a tool for industrialization as the paradigm in 
development theory shifted from state-led development to market-led development. 
3 This typology of EPZ literature is adapted from Madani (1999: 83). 
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Many theorists suggested that one of the central reasons NICs in Asia industrialized 
quickly was because they created EPZs as part of their export promotion policies. The 
main arguments used to support EPZs are that they generate foreign exchange needed to 
finance imports of industrial inputs and capital goods, they help to achieve economies of 
scale, they provide employment, and they contribute to growth in GNP (Johansson and 
Nilsson 1997: 2115). However, export promotion supporters debate the benefits that 
EPZs provide to a developing country. 
Initially neo-classical economists suggested that EPZs had negative effects on 
developing countries, particularly countries with import tariffs, because it created two 
different markets: one market for exporting goods and one market for domestic goods. 
This was a problem because EPZs drew labour from the domestic market, which was 
primarily labour intensive, and this made the production of labour-intensive goods less 
advantageous because labour became more scarce (Hamada 1974; Madani 1999: 83). 
However, one flaw in this criticism is that it is based on a labour market at full or near 
full employment and many developing countries have a large pool of surplus labour. This 
means that EPZs do not significantly distort domestic labour markets because they would 
be drawing labour from a large pool of unemployed individuals. 
Subsequent neo-classical economists suggested that when other factors are taken 
into consideration, EPZs provide positive benefits for developing countries. One of these 
factors was the perceived trend that countries that create EPZs are more prone to open up 
other parts of their economy by reducing import tariffs so that they become more 
competitive (Devereux and Chen 1995: 712). Therefore, according to this theory, the 
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EPZ is not necessarily beneficial in itself, but acts as a catalyst to move the country 
forward in adopting neo-classical economic reforms such as reduced tariffs, less 
government intervention in industry, and fewer restrictions on FDI. 
Another method of evaluating the impact of EPZs on developing countries is to 
use a cost-benefit analysis. This method, employed by a number of researchers, 
encompasses a variety of factors to determine if EPZs provide a net benefit to the welfare 
of a developing country. Peter Warr uses this method in his research on EPZs in 
Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, and the Philippines. He examines the implications on 
a country's economic welfare based on the profits and losses of a firm in an EPZ, 
foreign-exchange earnings by EPZ firms, employment, technology transfer between EPZ 
firms and domestic firms, domestic sales of EPZ products, purchase of domestic raw 
materials and capital goods (backward linkages), electricity use, domestic borrowing, 
taxes, and development and associated costs of developing and maintaining an EPZ 
(Warr 1990: 146-51). According to Warr, the most commonly used arguments for 
governments supporting EPZ development is that they provide "foreign exchange 
earnings, employment and technology transfer" (Ibid.: 157). With regards to foreign 
exchange earnings and employment, he finds that the EPZs contribute significantly; 
however, he argues that an insignificant amount of technology transfer has taken place 
between EPZ firms and domestic firms partly because EPZ firms use very few domestic 
inputs for manufacturing (Ibid.: 158). Furthermore, Warr finds that EPZ firms contribute 
very little to tax revenues due to generous tax holidays. Warr also found that in the 
Philippines the infrastructural costs of building and maintaining the EPZ outweighed the 
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sum of all benefits, and the cost of subsidizing electricity in the Malaysian EPZ 
outweighed the combined benefits from the use of local raw materials, local capital 
equipment and all tax revenues raised from EPZ firms (Ibid.: 157). Warr's conclusion is 
that EPZs have a very limited impact as catalysts for development using the cost-benefit 
analysis; he suggests that developing countries would be better off liberalizing their 
domestic economy in accordance with neo-classical economic principles instead of 
developing EPZs (Ibid.: 160). Thus, Warr offers the same prescription for economic 
development as Devereux and Chen, but he provides a useful methodology for evaluating 
EPZs by looking at the costs and benefits of a wide variety of factors relating to EPZs. 
New Growth Theory, a term used by Dorsati Madani, attempts to go beyond the 
cost-benefit analysis of measurable factors such as employment creation, tax revenue, 
and infrastructural costs discussed above (Madani 1999: 84). New Growth Theory 
attempts to capture more abstract externalities of EPZs, such as their impact on domestic 
manufacturer exports and their potential to act as a catalyst to make domestic firms more 
productive and competitive by demonstrating better production methods and training of 
local workers and managers. Helena Johansson and Lars Nilsson use this theory to 
suggest that EPZs have a catalytic effect on domestic manufacturers (Johansson and 
Nilsson 1997: 2115). To quantify this effect, they determine whether the establishment of 
EPZs affects total host country exports (Ibid.: 2116). Their data show that there is indeed 
a correlation between increases in EPZ exports and increases in host country exports 
outside of the EPZ in the case of the Malaysian EPZs. As exports in EPZs increased, so 
did exports in non-EPZ production (Ibid.). Johansson and Nilsson suggest that the reason 
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for this correlation is that, "EPZs may contribute to economic development by the 
bringing of export know-how to the host country, thereby reducing the idea gap present 
in many developing countries" (Ibid.: 2123). 
Although Johansson and Nilsson show a correlation between EPZ exports and 
host country exports, it is hard to establish with certainty that host country exports are 
increasing because of EPZs and not because of other factors. There may indeed be some 
catalyst effect on host country exports due to the establishment of EPZs, but it cannot be 
concluded with any certainty that EPZs are the most important factor in increasing host 
country exports, rather than other factors, such as international demand for products, 
exchange rates, firm competitiveness, political stability, or macroeconomic policies. 
In the case of many African countries, governments have established EPZs in the 
hope that they would transform the industrial sector into a leading driver of the economy 
by producing a greater variety and volume of manufactures higher in the value chain. 
However, the establishment of EPZs in several SSA countries such as Namibia, Lesotho, 
Malawi, and Swaziland has failed to substantially alter the industrial sector (Jauch 2002; 
Kaplinsky 2007). Some EPZs in SSA experienced manufacturing growth in the apparel 
sector in the 1990s and early 2000s, but when the Multi-Fibre Agreement expired in 
2005, many manufacturing firms re-located to lower cost jurisdictions in Asia. This trend 
reinforces the hypothesis put forward by Rolfe, Woodward and Kagira (2004) that 
investments in African EPZs, particularly in textiles and apparel, are footloose and only 
seek to take advantage of short-term tax incentives and will easily re-locate to other 
jurisdictions when there are opportunities for better tax incentives. Rolfe, Woodward, and 
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Kagira state that, "Basing a development strategy on garment exports is questionable at 
best. Apparel is the quintessential footloose industry, opting for short-term tax 
incentives" (Ibid.). The footloose nature of investments in EPZs and the predominance of 
low skill textile and apparel manufacturing also influence the quality of employment in 
EPZs. The relationship between labour theory and EPZ development will be explored 
more fully in the following section. 
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Labour and Development 
This section of the literature review will examine some of the most influential 
labour theories, in relation to industrialization, and their impact on development. The 
purpose of delving into labour theory literature is to place employment in EPZ 
development within a broader theoretical context. This section parallels the previous 
section by analyzing labour theories associated with production for a domestic market 
and then analyzing labour theories associated with producing for export markets. The 
first part of this section will review literature on Fordism and its impact on employment 
and development. The second part of this section examines the changing nature of 
employment and industrialization in the 1960s and 1970s as countries switched from ISI 
to EOI. Lastly, various interpretations of the impact of EPZs on employment will be 
explored in relation to labour theory. 
Fordism 
Fordism has its roots in the production methods of Henry Ford in the 1910s, 
which were considered revolutionary at the time. A major component of Fordism 
involved the specialization of labour, whereby individual labourers at the assembly plant 
were responsible for one specific task as the assembly line moved. This production 
method incorporated much of the Taylorist principles of speeding production by keeping 
machinery continuously running, thereby limiting the loss of time involved in starting up 
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machinery and preparing production runs (Aglietta 1979: 116)4. This process vastly 
increased production and decreased the amount of training needed for workers because 
they only had to complete a few tasks instead of being involved in many different aspects 
of production. 
Another significant aspect of Fordist theory involved the way in which labourers 
were paid. Ford introduced a daily wage rate to replace piece rates and he also paid his 
labourers significantly higher wages than other employers so that he could attract a 
healthy and productive labour force to maximize production (Munck 2002: 31-32). Ford 
also believed that paying workers enough to buy the products that they built would 
further stimulate demand for his vehicles. In defense of his high-wage model, when 
compared to other wages in similar industries, he states, "why do we hear so much talk 
about the 'liquidation of labour' and the benefits that will flow to the country from 
cutting wages - which means only the cutting of buying power and curtailing of the home 
market?" (Ford 1923:116). This highlights one of the key elements of Fordism; it was 
designed for a system of domestic consumption. Ford's vehicles were, for the most part, 
produced and consumed domestically which added to the incentive to pay workers a 
wage so that they could afford to consume the products. This is a key aspect of Fordism 
because it contrasts significantly to the EPZ model of production where goods are 
4 Taylorism became the dominant method of industrial production in the late 19th century in the United 
States and Western Europe. Taylorism emphasized the study of time and motion in the production 
processes to make them more efficient and human labour power was reduced to a cycle of repetitive 
movements and the qualitative characteristics of labour were transferred to machines. Human labour 
power thus became homogenized on a massive scale (Aglietta 1979:113-116). See Aglietta for a more 
detailed overview of Taylorism. 
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manufactured almost exclusively for foreign markets resulting in little incentive to pay 
wages that would stimulate domestic demand. 
The Fordist mode of production, both the introduction of a daily wage rate, and 
the reorganization of the factory also had significant implications for the development of 
society. The higher wages paid under Fordism meant that workers could afford to 
purchase basic necessities such as food, shelter, and clothing which was very important 
because a healthy labour force also meant a productive labour force. Gramsci suggested 
that the higher wage rates were necessary because they offered ".. .the possibility of 
realizing a standard of living which is adequate to the new methods of production and 
work which demand a particular degree of expenditure of muscular and nervous energy" 
(Gramsci 1971: 312). The higher wages also meant that factory labourers could purchase 
a widening array of consumer goods such as automobiles and various household 
appliances in turn creating more demand for factory produced goods. As Fordism became 
more entrenched in the American system of production it created a fast growing middle 
class of consumers that ushered in the post-WWII 'golden age' of US capitalism. Similar 
transformations took place in Western European countries as they rebuilt after WWII5. 
Fordism also depended greatly on the Keynesian Welfare State (KWS) in order to remain 
the dominant mode of production. Rising consumption coupled with stable growth and 
increasing state funded social welfare services such as infrastructure, health, education, 
state pension plans, and state regulated employment benefits allowed Fordism to go 
5 For a typology of the different variants of Fordism in various countries see Tickell and Peck 1995: 362. 
Full reference in Works Cited. 
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relatively unchallenged until the mid to late 1960s (Ramasamy 2005: 9-10). Ramasamy 
states that the Fordist structure of accumulation coupled with the Keynesian mode of 
regulation allowed for a social pact between labour and capital, regulated by the state, 
that drew wide support from the working classes and allowed it to go unchallenged by 
more radical labour factions (Ibid.)- Antonio and Bonnano refer to this era as High 
Fordism because the gains in private sector productivity coupled with the state's 
Keynesian management of aggregate demand through monetary regulation and state 
spending created a balance between production and consumption, a low unemployment 
rate, steady accumulation, and high rates of profit (Antonio and Bonnano 2000: 36-37). 
Although, Fordism was the dominant mode of production and regulation in the 
US and variants of it were present throughout Europe and Japan, it was never achieved to 
the same scale in countries of the developing world. Until the 1960s most of the countries 
in the Global South had been supplying raw materials to the Global North for the 
production of manufactured goods. This meant that there was an absence of a growing 
urban working class engaged in factory production similar to what was happening in the 
US and parts of Europe. Therefore, the Fordist mode of production and consumption 
could not take hold in the same manner because there was a lack of a domestic working 
class to consume the products. Structuralist theorists such as Raul Prebisch and Hans 
Singer suggested that the lack of production of manufactured goods in countries of the 
South was one of the reasons why these countries were underdeveloped (Prebisch 1981; 
Singer 1964). The structuralist theories eventually led to the adoption of Import 
Substitution Industrialization (ISI) in many developing countries in order to create a 
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working middle class and achieve the same 'golden era' growth as the United States and 
Western Europe (see section on ISI in the previous section). Kenya's experience with ISI 
and its impact on labour and development will be examined more thoroughly in chapter 
2. 
However, by the late 1960s and early 1970s the 'golden era' of growth in the 
United States and Europe was coming to an end. Michel Aglietta (1979) suggests that 
there was an over-accumulation of capital because it was becoming more difficult to 
achieve productivity gains, and there was growing resistance to the intensification of 
labour. There were also new economic threats from Asian manufacturers and an oil crisis 
that threatened to undermine an economic system that was reliant on cheap oil for both 
production and consumption. Politically, the hegemony of the welfare state was being 
questioned because of the US failure in Vietnam, the rise of anti-Western movements, 
and new political alignments such as OPEC (Antonio & Bonanno 2000: 37-38). The 
challenges to the KWS and Fordism changed the labour process significantly in the 
Global North and South and new theories were developed to explain this transformation. 
New International Division of Labour 
The New International Division of Labour (NIDL) is an approach used to offer an 
explanation for changing production and labour processes in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Supporters of the NIDL approach such as Folker Frobel, Jiirgen Heinrichs, and Otto 
Kreye argue that the division of labour between the Global North and Global South began 
to experience a tremendous shift in the 1960s (Frobel, Heinrichs, and Kreye 1980). They 
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suggest that the role of the Global South as a provider of raw materials for Northern 
manufacturers began to change because there was a breakdown of traditional social 
economic structures in the South allowing for the emergence of a large pool of cheap 
available labour (this is partly due to increasing migration from rural areas to urban areas 
as peasants could no longer survive on small subsistence farming due to the changing 
nature of agricultural production), a fragmentation of the industrial production process 
allowing for unskilled sub-processes to be relocated to the developing world, and a 
revolution in transportation and communications technology making relocation of 
industrial processes to the South easier (Ibid.). 
The NIDL approach is a useful tool for analyzing the changing nature of 
worldwide export oriented manufacturing processes, especially in textiles and electronics, 
but there are significant weaknesses in the approach when it is generalized to explain the 
entire world labour system. For example, Ronaldo Munck criticizes the NIDL approach 
for dismissing industrialization processes in the developing world prior to the 1960s, as 
well as dismissing the role of the state as though the 'world market' existed beyond state 
control (Munck 2002: 40). Robin Cohen also criticizes NIDL for overstating its claim 
that there was a 'new' division of labour (Cohen 1991: 123-149). He argues that there 
have always been divisions of labour divided by gender, class, race, or geographical 
location; there were sharp divisions of international labour in previous eras and NIDL 
understates this fact. In reference to the emphasis that NIDL places on newly 
industrializing Asian countries (NICs) as evidence of a 'new' division of labour Cohen 
states, 
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How new is the 'new' international division of labour? There is no way of 
determining this from the theory itself, as no historical comparisons with 
other international divisions of labour are provided. It is as if the NIDL 
theorists boarded a time machine in the mid-nineteenth century to arrive at 
Hong Kong and Singapore late last night, without bothering to land at any 
of the intermediate airports - notably those marked on the historical maps 
as 'Imperialism' and 'Colonialism' (Ibid.: 133). 
However, criticisms aside, NIDL theory remains a useful tool for explaining 
changing global labour patterns within specific manufacturing industries, and helps to 
explain the growth in Export Processing Zones (EPZs) in the developing world during the 
1960s and 1970s. Munck and Cohen also believed that NIDL was a useful tool for 
analysis in this area despite their criticisms (Munck 2002; Cohen 1991: 149). Because of 
this strength NIDL is a good basis for exploring the development potential of EPZs with 
regard to labour. 
NIDL explains how the labour characteristics of EPZs marked a clear departure 
from Fordist principles. In the Fordist model of production it was necessary to cover the 
costs of the reproduction of workers and pay them enough to stimulate domestic 
demand, however the NIDL theorists suggest that wages in EPZs often do not cover the 
costs of the reproduction of workers because there is an almost unlimited supply of cheap 
labour and the products being manufactured are for export leaving little incentive to 
create domestic demand through higher wages (Frobel et al. 1980). However, other 
6 In this context reproduction of workers refers to paying a wage that allows for a healthy and productive 
labour force because they are able to use their wages to pay for adequate food, shelter, clothing, health 
etc. Furthermore, it allows workers to reproduce offspring that are adequately taken care of through 
education, health, clothing etc. and will become productive workers themselves when they reach 
maturity. 
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aspects of Fordism such as the Taylorist structuring of factories whereby human labour 
power is reduced to a series of repetitive movements are still used in EPZs. From a 
development perspective the NEDL break from Fordist principles, in terms of the wage 
model and the connection to the welfare state, raises an interesting issue; if workers in 
export-oriented industries are not paid a wage to cover the cost of reproduction, how does 
this contribute to development? 
The NTDL theorists argued that there was little if any development potential from 
labour created in the EPZs of the 1960s and 1970s. They state that, "there is nothing to 
indicate that the major problems confronting the underdeveloped countries can be solved 
through world market oriented industrialization, even if the process were to advance 
rapidly" (Ibid.). They come to this conclusion because the wages paid are too low for 
reproduction, the creation of job opportunities is limited to specific demographic groups 
(mostly young women), and there is little skill acquisition because of the deskilling 
process used in Taylorist production methods (Ibid.). 
Furthermore, from an industrialization perspective, potential for national 
development is limited for a number of reasons. First of all, there are few backward and 
forward linkages with the domestic market7. Secondly, technology transfer is limited 
because research and development often happens offsite and work involving complex 
techniques or high technology is often controlled by foreigners. Thirdly, profits are 
repatriated to the country where the firm is headquartered. Fourthly, developing countries 
7 A backward linkage refers to a domestic input such as raw material used in the production process. A 
forward linkage is something that is produced and used as an input in a domestic market. 
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often use state funds to provide infrastructure for the creation of EPZs and these 
investments are rarely recovered due to the low tax structure applied to firms operating in 
these zones (Ibid.). 
NIDL theory remains a useful tool for interpreting the change of labour processes 
that took place in the 1960s and 1970s. Today, the theory is useful for interpreting the 
lengthening global production chain used in producing manufactured goods and the 
implications this has on labour. EPZs, especially in the Kenyan context, represent and 
extreme lengthening of the production chain as the inputs for production are almost 
exclusively sourced outside of the domestic market and the finished product is exported 
predominantly to the global North. There is little incentive for manufacturing firms to pay 
a wage that would allow workers to purchase the product they produce because the 
majority of the products are consumed in export markets. 
Employment in Export Processing Zones 
Creating employment is an essential aspect of an effective industrial strategy and 
more broadly an overall development strategy. As a result, developing country 
governments have cited employment creation as one of the core objectives of EPZs 
(EPZA Kenya 2011). However, employment creation is one of the most debated issues in 
EPZ literature and is the focus of much discussion in both academia and among popular 
media and civil society organizations. The discussion of EPZ employment in this section 
will not be able to address all of the debates that relate to this topic. The literature on this 
subject is voluminous and varied, and I will not be able to adequately address all of the 
45 
literature because much of it falls outside the scope of the research question and requires 
a much broader and lengthier discussion to do the subject justice. Nonetheless, this 
section will address the discussion on EPZ employment as it relates to its impact on 
industrialization and development. 
The literature on EPZ employment is grouped into three separate categories. The 
first category of literature takes the view that EPZs provide employment that would not 
otherwise exist if EPZs were not created. Furthermore, this "status quo" approach 
suggests that this employment is contributing to broader development objectives by 
providing skills and income to workers in EPZ firms. 
The second category of literature is a reformist approach to EPZ, which holds that 
EPZs have the potential to provide employment, but only if specific regulations are 
implemented and enforced with regard to workers' welfare. Generally, the reformist view 
is that most EPZs do not currently provide employment that furthers development 
objectives, but that it is possible if governments develop and enforce national and 
international regulations. 
The last category of literature to be analyzed is the most radical view on EPZ 
employment, which argues that EPZs are unable to provide employment leading to 
development because the EPZ model is dependent on labour intensive, low skill, and low 
wage employment and that any attempt to improve the quality of employment would 
erode the advantages of an EPZ. This literature supports the development of alternatives 
to EPZs, such as a renewed focus on domestic industry. 
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The Status Quo 
The supporters of the current EPZ model, with relation to employment, view any 
attempt to regulate labour standards as market distorting. This group includes those that 
adhere strictly to neo-classical economic principals. The World Bank has explicitly 
supported this view during the 1980s and 1990s. For example, the 1995 World 
Development Report entitled Workers in an Integrating World exemplifies the 
commitment of the WB to neo-classical economics in relation to employment. The report 
states that, 
The benefits enjoyed by labor in fast-growing economies are not the result 
of job creation in the public sector or wage increases mandated by 
government. Expanding employment opportunities and rising wages are 
the consequences of growth and economy-wide increases in output per 
worker. A market-based development strategy achieves these outcomes 
through investment decisions by firms, households, and government 
(World Bank 1995: 18-19). 
In specific relation to EPZs, the WB, in the same report, admits that there are concerns 
about the fluid nature of capital investments, particularly in textiles and footwear; 
however, the WB states that overall job creation in EPZs is better than the alternative of 
not creating any employment at all (Ibid.: 62). The WB believes that EPZ jobs are the 
first step on a ladder towards higher value manufacturing and eventually better paying 
jobs, as domestic firms mature and become more productive due to a liberalized market: 
"Low skill jobs must be seen as just one step in the growth dynamic" (Ibid.: 62). A 
number of neo-classical economists have articulated the same viewpoint on EPZs and 
employment as the WB. For example, Stanford economist Robert Flanagan makes the 
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argument that EPZ jobs provide better working conditions than jobs outside of the EPZ 
because EPZs need to compete with other forms of employment because they would fail 
to attract workers if this were not the case (Flanagan 2006: 177). Using neo-classical 
economic theory, Flanagan's argument is entirely logical; EPZ firms would have to 
increase wages and improve working conditions to attract workers if wages and 
conditions in employment outside the EPZ were better. However, for many workers, EPZ 
employment is the only option for employment; there is no alternative. Furthermore, 
Flanagan's analysis fails to take into consideration the public funds used by the 
government to subsidize EPZ firms (e.g. tax incentives, subsidized electricity, publicly 
funded infrastructure) and the employment these public funds could create if they were 
directed into other employment strategies. 
However, the status quo view remains the dominant view of the WB, neo-
classical economists, and governments that develop EPZs. 
The Reformist View 
Organizations like the International Labour Organization (ILO), some trade 
unions that are active in EPZs, and several human rights organizations support the 
reformist view on EPZ employment. These organizations generally adhere to the 
principle of 'decent work' which frames 'decent' work as a human right. The reformists 
do not necessarily take issue with the creation of EPZs, but rather seek to improve the 
welfare of workers in EPZs through creation and enforcement of international and 
national labour regulations. 
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According to the ELO there are four broad themes in ensuring that workers are 
engaged in decent work. The first of these themes is 'job creation'. The ILO suggests that 
in order to create jobs adhering to decent work, there must be "an economy that generates 
opportunities for investment, entrepreneurship, skills development, job creation and 
sustainable livelihoods" (ILO 2010a). The second theme, 'guaranteeing rights at work', 
entails making sure that workers are represented, that they are able to participate in 
making their views known, and that labour laws work in their interest (Ibid.). The third 
theme, 'extending social protection', involves, "ensuring that women and men enjoy 
working conditions that are safe, allow adequate free time and rest, take into account 
family and social values, provide for adequate compensation in case of lost or reduced 
income and permit access to adequate healthcare" (Ibid.). The fourth theme, 'promoting 
social dialogue', is articulated as, "Respect for the fundamental rights of freedom of 
association and collective bargaining; strong independent workers' and employers' 
organizations with the technical capacity and knowledge required to participate in social 
dialogue; political will and commitment to engage in social dialogue on the part of all 
parties; [and] appropriate institutional support" (ILO 2010b). 
Using this framework as a starting point, many NGO's, unions, and individuals 
have advocated for reforms in line with the decent work agenda. These groups believe 
that EPZs have the ability to provide decent working conditions if such reforms were 
enacted and enforced by international and national governing bodies. 
In response to pressure from activist groups demanding reforms, major North 
American and European retailers have adopted more rigorous sourcing codes from their 
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suppliers that seek to ensure that minimum labour standards are being met. However, the 
length of the global production chains and the pressure on retailers to reduce costs to 
consumers makes the enforcement of these codes of conduct difficult. People and groups 
adhering to the radical view suggest that the current globalized system of production and 
consumption, based on neo-classical economic principles, is incompatible with providing 
employment adhering to decent work principles in EPZs. 
The Radical View 
Those that hold the radical view of EPZ employment call for the abandonment of 
EPZs in favour of alternative employment creation strategies that focus more on local 
industries instead of chasing FDI and producing manufactures for distant export markets. 
The 'radicals' believe that EPZs are unable to provide decent employment and working 
conditions because they are structured in such a manner that makes decent working 
conditions impossible. For example, Herbert Jauch, a supporter of the labour movement 
in Namibia and Southern Africa, argues that the employment created in EPZs, 
particularly in Southern Africa, comes at the expense of workers' rights (Jauch 2002). 
Jauch suggests that EPZs cannot be reformed to improve the welfare of workers in a 
substantial manner because EPZ firms are only interested in manufacturing in locations 
with the lowest labour costs. This results in a 'race to the bottom' which pits countries in 
Southern Africa in a competition against each other to lower their labour costs thereby 
undermining the objectives of regional cooperation and improved livelihoods for the 
region's workers (ibid.: 110). This argument runs counter to the position of those that 
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take the 'status quo' position and their belief that EPZ labour-intensive employment will 
eventually lead to higher value manufacturing. The radical view also discounts the ability 
of the reformers to achieve their goal because any attempt at improving working 
conditions in a substantive manner would drive EPZ firms to a lower wage jurisdiction. 
In some regards the radical view and the status quo share some commonalities in 
that both viewpoints see efforts at legislation and enforcement of labour conditions as 
futile. The radicals and the status quo both believe that the most sustainable method for 
improving labour conditions is for firms to transition into more productive 
manufacturing, the difference is that the status quo believes that EPZs are the tool for 
achieving this goal whereas the radicals see EPZs as a mechanism that is structurally 
incapable of leading to higher productivity because of its reliance on cheap labour, and 
manufacturing processes that are disconnected from the domestic economy. 
Conclusion 
This literature review evaluated different theories of industrialization to determine 
what impact they had on development objectives of increased exports and diversification 
of manufactured products, strengthening of the domestic manufacturing sector, and 
increased and better quality employment in the formal sector. The first part of the 
literature review focused on theories of industrialization and development by exploring 
ISI and EOI, as well as interpretations of the developmental state model. The second part 
of the literature review focused on labour and development with a particular emphasis on 
industrialization. 
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The literature on industrialization and development suggests that the current neo-
classical economics approach to industrialization is unable to fulfill the development 
objectives under consideration. The industrialization process that took place in the NICs 
provides evidence that these countries used many state-led policies of industrialization 
instead of solely relying on the free market to succeed in achieving their development 
objectives. The NICs actively promoted, and in some cases protected, their domestic 
manufacturers to transform their industrial sector. 
Current development plans in many African countries, developed with World 
Bank and donor country approval, explicitly avoid state interventionist policies in relation 
to industrialization and use the language of market competitiveness to promote market-
led policies (Cammack 2009). Neo-classical economic theory has delegitimized the state 
as a tool for active industrial policy. Rick Rowden comments on this delegitimization, 
stating, 
By the 1990s, the idea that states should play a proactive role in 
supporting the development of domestic industry had become decidedly 
unfashionable...Rather than focus on 'national' economic development, 
the new mantra became 'integration with the global economy' as the route 
to development...full-blown industrial policy was off the radar. Terms 
such as 'trade protection', 'subsidies', 'capital controls' and other forms of 
'industrial policies' came to be met with derision and disdain. Anyone 
from those in the aid agencies to the recipient African ministries interested 
in advancing their careers or getting more foreign aid for their 
governments learned to quickly dispense with such terminology (2010: 
504). 
Policymakers have relegated the role of the state to funding infrastructural projects and 
basic social programs such as health and education, but any discussion about the state 
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taking a more active role in industrialization is met with resistance by citing past 
examples of mismanagement, corruption, and inefficiencies in industrial parastatals. 
However, State-led industrialization policies in South Korea, Taiwan and other NICs 
suggest that the state can employ a more interventionist role in economic development 
and be successful (Amsden 2001; Chang 2006, 2007). Considering the divergent views 
on industrial policy between the mainstream neo-classical economics approach used by 
institutions such as the World Bank and the revisionist approach used by Amsden and 
Chang in reference to the NICs, this thesis will examine the extent to which Kenyan 
industrial policy embodies the mainstream approach, or diverts from it, and the impact 
that this has had on their industrial development through the study of EPZs. This will 
require examination of the EPZs effect on overall exports, impact on the overall 
manufacturing sector through linkages with domestic firms, and the type of products 
being produced in the EPZ. 
The literature on labour and development showed the transformation of labour 
from Fordism, which primarily focused on production for domestic markets, to 
globalized production chains, where workers produce manufactures for export markets. 
The transformation in production, according to the critics of neo-classical economics, 
means that there are fewer incentives for manufacturing firms to pay higher wages due to 
increased fluidity of capital and the employment of workers who no longer consume the 
goods they produce. The status quo approach to employment, as discussed earlier, 
suggests that open markets and free trade will eventually lead to better employment 
opportunities as manufacturing firms are forced to become more efficient and productive 
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to compete in a global market because it allows countries to specialize in production in 
which they hold a comparative advantage. The radical view suggests that open markets 
and free trade, as embodied in EPZs, will lead to a race to the bottom, whereby global 
capital can move freely to the jurisdiction with the best tax incentives, cheapest labour, 
and ultimately lowest costs of production. Considering the case of Kenyan EPZs, this 
thesis will seek to determine what effect fluid foreign capital and globalized production is 
having on EPZ workers and how this relates to labour theory. This will be achieved 
through data collection on employment creation in EPZs (specifically full-time 
permanent employment), wage rates, and the quality of employment. 
Thesis Statement 
The hypothesis argues that the Kenyan EPZ program fails to achieve increases in 
exports and diversification into higher value products, closer backward linkages with 
domestic manufacturers thereby strengthening the industrial sector, and increases in the 
quantity and quality of employment in the formal sector. The EPZ program will not 
significantly increase exports or diversify into higher value exports because EPZs are 
based on low cost, low skill production which offers no competitive advantage in higher 
value and more highly skilled production. EPZ firms can also relocate to other 
jurisdictions easily because they are not capital intensive and they do not require a highly 
skilled workforce. The EPZ program will not create closer backward linkages between 
domestic firms and EPZ firms because EPZs are designed to produce goods for export 
markets which means that most domestic manufacturers producing for the domestic 
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market have little incentive to gear their production to provide inputs for high turnover 
EPZ firms that frequently move from country to country in search of better incentives. In 
addition, the predominantly foreign ownership of EPZ firms means that most profits are 
repatriated outside of the country and not reinvested in the local economy. The EPZ 
program will also fail in significantly increasing the quantity and quality of employment 
in the formal sector because EPZ firms are reliant on cheap labour to produce goods and 
they can easily move to lower cost jurisdictions if wages increase. 
The EPZ program will fail to achieve these objectives because it is detached from 
an industrialization strategy that prioritizes domestic needs. The EPZ program represents 
an entrenchment of neo-classical economic theory that prioritizes free movement of 
global private capital, low transaction costs, and a limited role for the state in 
industrialization. These priorities are at odds with the industrialization success of Newly 
Industrializing Countries that used state-led policies to protect infant industries using a 
variety of policies such as tariffs, cheap credit, investment in research and development, 
and in some cases state ownership of enterprises. 
Methodology 
The research for this thesis was conducted using a case study approach. The 
Kenyan EPZs are the subject of this case study. I conducted fieldwork in Nairobi and 
surrounding areas from June 1-August 31, 2010. The majority of the data was gathered 
during this period. I undertook most of the fieldwork with the cooperation of the Labour 
Awareness and Resource Centre (LARC), a labour rights organization, as part of a 
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research internship. This internship was part of the Students for Development program 
coordinated by the Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada, with funding 
from the Canadian International Development Agency. 
Data Identification 
Several types of data were collected in the study of Kenyan EPZs. The data used 
for this case study can be divided into three categories: export and import data, data on 
linkages between EPZ firms and domestic firms, and employment data. These three 
categories of data correspond with the three core objectives of the Kenyan EPZ program: 
increases in exports and diversification into higher value products, closer backward 
linkages with domestic manufacturers thereby strengthening the industrial sector, and 
increases in the quantity and quality of employment in the formal sector. 
The data collected on exports and imports includes overall export and import 
figures of the Kenyan economy in order to provide some context with regard to the main 
products that the country exports and imports. Current import/export data as well as 
historical data was used to identify trends in imports and exports in various sectors. The 
historical data was drawn from secondary sources such as books and articles on the 
Kenyan economy; Chapter 2 (background chapter) discusses this data. The contemporary 
import/export data (2000-present) was drawn from primary sources consisting of 
statistical data published by the Government of Kenya through the Kenya National 
Bureau of Statistics. 
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Export data from the Kenyan EPZs was also collected and analyzed. This data 
consists of exports by sector, export destinations, and value of exports from EPZs. The 
majority of this data was gathered from annual reports published by the Kenyan Export 
Processing Zone Authority (EPZA). These reports are yearly summaries of the overall 
economic performance of the EPZs. 
Data on linkages between domestic firms and EPZ firms was collected from a 
variety of primary and secondary sources. This data consists of the monetary value of 
goods and services purchased by EPZ firms from the local economy. The primary sources 
consist of data published by the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics and annual reports 
published by the EPZA. Other primary sources include a formal interview conducted 
with an EPZA communications officer as well as informal conversations with 
representatives from the Kenyan Association of Manufacturers (KAM). Secondary 
sources are drawn from Kenyan newspapers such as The Daily Nation and Business 
Daily. 
Data on overall employment in Kenya is gathered from the Kenyan Institute for 
Public Policy Research Association, the Kenyan National Bureau of Statistics, and the 
IMF. This data consists of the overall employment rate, employment by sector, and 
percentage of employees engaged in formal and informal employment. This data provides 
an overall picture of employment in Kenya and how it relates to employment in EPZs. 
Data on employment creation and the quality of employment in EPZs was collected from 
primary sources from the Kenyan National Bureau of Statistics and annual reports from 
the EPZA. The data from these sources consists of overall employment numbers from 
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2002-2009 as well as wage rates over the same time period. In addition, I formally 
interviewed a former EPZ employee, a communications officer from the EPZA and 
engaged in informal conversations with other current and former EPZ workers. These 
interviews and informal conversations provided information on issues such as casual 
employment in EPZs, union-employer relationships, and health and safety compliance. 
An internal report by LARC from a focus group study with EPZ workers was also 
consulted. This report contained information from workers on wage rates, overtime pay, 
safety issues, and purchaser compliance protocol. 
Apart from the data collection used specifically for three main objectives, a 
significant amount of time was also spent at LARC, conducting research on labour 
relations in the EPZ and on the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). The 
majority of EPZ products are exported to the United States under AGOA, making this 
agreement important for understanding some of the underlying sociopolitical factors that 
influence exports from the EPZ. The culmination of the research on AGOA was a 
presentation that I gave to various stakeholders and a subsequent discussion of AGOA 
and its impact on the Kenyan economy and the EPZ sector specifically. The participants 
of this presentation and discussion included LARC, the Kenyan Human Rights 
Commission, EPZA, Kenyan Association of Manufacturers, as well as representation 
from the Kenyan ministry of trade. This discussion provided a useful insight into issues 
of EPZs from stakeholders from varying viewpoints. 
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Methodological Approach and Limits to Study 
The case study of Kenyan EPZs is a qualitative study. Data was gathered from a 
variety of primary and secondary sources as previously discussed. I chose to use a 
combination of primary documents, secondary sources, and interviews in an attempt to 
triangulate the data so that it was as accurate as possible. Being able to conduct field 
research in Nairobi was also an invaluable asset in gathering data that would not have 
been possible otherwise, particularly engaging in interviews and informal discussions 
with various stakeholders. However, all research has limits, and the research conducted 
for this case study is no exception. 
One of the most significant limits to this study was the inability to interview a 
greater number of current employees in the EPZs. It was difficult to interview employees 
because they work long hours during the week and many of them also work on Saturdays, 
this leaves employees with little free time for interviews; the majority of employees are 
young women whom also have family responsibilities. As a result of this limit, there is 
less information on working conditions in EPZ factories than I had originally intended. 
Another limit to this study was the inability to pinpoint the exact owners of each 
EPZ firm, their financial background, and the way that funds were moving into and out of 
firms. Many firms in the EPZ are privately held and those who hold this information are 
reluctant to divulge it. This information would have added some useful insight into the 
profitability of firms, and how the profits are used. 
A significant limit impacting the analysis of linkages between EPZ firms and 
domestic firms was the way that this data was published by the government of Kenya. 
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The data includes all of the local goods and services purchase by EPZ firms and this data 
is not broken down any further. Therefore, there are no specific numbers on how much is 
spent specifically on utilities, labour, shipping, maintenance etc. This limit made it 
difficult to analyze the specific linkages between EPZ firms and domestic manufacturing 
firms. 
Last but not least, there were limits to my time and finances in conducting this 
study. A larger study with a greater number of interviews from participants not only in 
Kenya but participants connected to EPZs in other African countries would have been 
useful for comparative purposes. 
However, despite the limits, I feel that the information and analysis of this 
information is accurate and makes a useful contribution to the study of industrialization 
and development in Kenya. 
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Chapter 2 
Kenya's Industrialization Policies 
This section of the thesis provides background information on industrialization 
policies in Kenya from the colonial era to the present. The objective of this chapter is to 
provide insight into the particular way in which the government of Kenya introduced and 
implemented industrialization policies. Specific emphasis is given to the external and 
internal factors that shaped Kenya's industrial policy. These factors are significant 
because it shows areas of confluence and tension between domestic influences, such as 
indigenous manufacturers and politicians, and external influences such as foreign 
investors, donor countries, and International Financial Institutions (IFIs). The interaction 
between these various influences is still at work in contemporary Kenya and plays an 
important role in shaping contemporary industrial policy, specifically in relation to EPZ 
development. 
This chapter also shows how Kenya's industrial policies changed to reflect the 
change in mainstream development theory, discussed in the literature review, from state-
led industrialization policies in the 1960s and 1970s to market-led industrialization 
policies in the 1980s and 1990s. Although, many of the state-led industrialization policies 
were problematic, as discussed in the second section of this chapter, the liberalization 
policies in the industrial sector have done little to stimulate the sector. This chapter shows 
that EPZs are simply a continuation of liberalized industrial policy. 
The chapter is divided into three distinct sections. The first section examines the 
influence of colonialism on industrial development in Kenya. The second section 
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explores the industrialization policies implemented in the early post-independence period 
and the emphasis on growing an indigenous manufacturing sector, through state 
interventionist policies, to replace imports. The third section analyzes the change from 
the emphasis on domestic manufacturers and inward looking industrial policies to 
outward looking policies and an increased emphasis on attracting FDI. This section also 
examines the effect of Structural Adjustment Policies on industrialization. 
Colonial Impacts on Industrialization 
Before WWII there was some limited industrial development, mostly in 
agricultural processing, but most of the industrialization under the colonial administration 
began during the war and continued into the post-WWH era. Prior to WWII, the British 
economic policy in Kenya focused on extracting raw materials for British manufacturing 
industries; there was a deliberate effort to prevent the development of a manufacturing 
industry in Kenya (Ogonda 1992:161). This policy was consistent with the way that 
Britain treated most settler colonies at the time; the primary objective was to extract raw 
materials cheaply from the colonies so that manufacturers in Britain could keep their 
costs down and increase their profits. The colonies also provided an export market for 
British manufactured goods. 
However, a significant change in the colonial administration's approach to 
industrial policy in Kenya took place during and after WWII. The war made it difficult 
for Britain to ship goods to Kenya because of the threat of attack on merchant ships. The 
shortage of consumer and capital goods in Kenya began to threaten the growth of the 
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economy, so it became necessary to begin manufacturing some products locally to ease 
the shortages and strengthen the economy (Ibid.: 164). By the end of the war, Kenya was 
producing items such as cooking oil, margarine, soap, shoes, bicycle tires, and bicycle 
tubes (Ibid.: 165). The state-backed East African Industrial Management Board, whom 
directly owned plants and equipment, funded and supported many local manufacturers 
(Fahnbulleh 2006: 36). 
After the war ended, the policy of increasing local manufacturing continued 
because large multinational corporations such as Unilever wanted to take advantage of 
cheap labour in Kenya (relative to the cost of labour in Britain). Furthermore, the Labour 
Party had come to power in Britain and it was keen to develop new industries in Britain's 
colonies. The British government provided government backed loans to private firms 
through the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) in an effort to encourage firms to 
invest in new industrial projects in the colonies; the IDC took over many of the functions 
previously performed by the Industrial Management Board with regard to supporting and 
assisting the private sector (Swainson 1980: 121-22). The IDC acted as a finance agency: 
"It prioritised projects that would contribute to the ultimate good of the colony, that 
would be self-financing, that were not in direct competition with existing private 
enterprises, and where the possibility of loans from other lending agencies had been 
exhausted" (Fahnbulleh 2006: 36). Apart from the IDC, the colonial administration used 
other strategies to encourage private sector involvement in industrialization. These 
strategies included tax incentives, industrial licensing, industrial research, selective 
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custom duty refunds, some ad hoc tariff protections, provision of buildings in industrial 
estates, and allocation of industrial land (Fahnbulleh 2006: 36; Ogonda 1992: 165). 
Many of the industrial strategies employed by the colonial administration in the 
post-war era contributed significantly to the growth of industry in Kenya. By 1963, the 
manufacturing sector employed 50,000 people in urban areas and between 10,000 and 
15,000 people in rural craft industries (Ogonda 1992: 165). Manufacturing accounted for 
about 10.4% of GDP by 1964 (Leys 1975: 277). Although the manufacturing sector in 
Kenya was relatively small compared to industrialized countries, it was much larger than 
most newly independent African countries in the same era. Most Sub-Saharan African 
countries, apart from Belgian Congo and Southern Rhodesia, had manufacturing sectors 
that accounted for 2.5% to 6.5% of their GDP (Fahnbulleh 2005: 30). However, even 
though Kenya had a significant manufacturing sector, the vast majority of the sector was 
owned and controlled by Europeans and Asians: ".. .of the total nominal company capital 
registered between 1946 and 1963, 68% was European, 21% Asian, 11% combined Asian 
and European and less than 1% African" (Ogonda 1992: 168). The fact that Africans 
controlled such a small share of the industrial sector had a significant impact on the drive 
to 'Africanize' the economy in the early post-colonial era. 
Despite the lack of African ownership in the industrial sector, Kenya was still 
much better positioned than many other newly independent African countries in terms of 
industrialization. The industrial policies implemented by the colonial administration 
provided Kenya with an industrial base, even though these policies were implemented to 
64 
benefit the British. This industrial base was a strong contributing factor to the growth in 
Kenya's industrial sector in the early post-independence period. 
Independence: Africanizing the Industrial Sector 
In the early years of independence, Kenya embarked on a development strategy 
that emphasized infrastructural and social spending; the government wanted to create a 
welfare state similar to what was taking place in several European countries and North 
America at the time. The government's three main development objectives during this 
time were "growth, equity, and Africanization of the economy" (Mwau & Handa 1995: 
7). The type of government intervention that the official development plan promoted was 
"a mixed economy in which strategic and essential resources and services, such as 
railways and harbours, principal roads, airways, broadcasting and post and 
telecommunication, would be government responsibility" (Ochieng 1992: 264-265). 
In terms of industrial strategy, Kenya focused most of its support on facilitating 
private sector growth through investment in infrastructure, access to credit, and 
protecting domestic industries through tariffs and industrial licensing (Fahnbulleh 2006: 
38). For the most part, Kenya's industrialization policies in the post-independent era did 
not differ substantially from those implemented under the colonial administration in the 
post-war period. Kenya did not adopt the more radical state interventionist industrial 
policies being practiced at the time in Tanzania and other newly independent states in the 
region under the banner of 'African Socialism'. Instead of implementing radical state 
interventions, Kenya strongly encouraged the involvement of foreign private capital in 
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the industrial sector. The Foreign Investment Act of 1964 allowed foreign investors to 
apply for a 'Certificate of Approval Enterprise' that, "guaranteed the right to repatriate 
profits, loans, interests on their loans and the approved proportion of the net proceeds of 
sale of all or part of the approved enterprise. They were further assured against 
nationalization" (Ogonda 1992: 304). The encouragement of foreign capital in the 
industrial sector meant that the ownership structure changed very little after 
independence; most of the industries were still owned and controlled by foreign 
investors. 
However, from a macroeconomic view, the industrial strategy of the early post-
independence era served Kenya well. Between 1964 and 1972 GDP grew at an annual 
average rate of 6.8% and after accounting for population growth, GDP grew at a rate 
between 3.5% and 3.8% annually (Hazlewood 1979: 24). The manufacturing sector also 
performed well during this era, growing by 7.5% per year between 1964 and 1970 
(Sharpley & Lewis 1990: 207). 
Beginning in the late 1960s and continuing into the 1970s, Kenya took a more 
radical approach towards industrialization. The state began getting more directly involved 
in the industrial sector, and a greater emphasis was placed on growing the sector 
(Fahnbulleh 2006: 39). The government believed that an increased emphasis on industry 
would diversify Kenya's economy away from agriculture and help the country achieve its 
ambitious development plans by substantially increasing government revenues to pay for 
the increase in social spending. The 1970-1974 development plan budgeted 720 million 
pounds to be spent compared with 430 million pounds being spent in the first 
66 
development plan; the plan earmarked much of the new money to be spent on large 
public infrastructure projects such as roads, water, and education (Gatheru 2005: 195). 
More importance was also placed on the growth of the industrial sector because there was 
a growing unemployment problem and the government wanted to increase the 
participation of Africans in the sector. Kenya's population was increasing rapidly and the 
agricultural sector was unable to absorb the growing labour pool even after agricultural 
resettlement schemes had been implemented to increase the number of smallholder farms. 
The government began a more aggressive push to industrialize and 'Africanize' 
the sector by implementing a number of different policies. One such policy was the 
Trades Licensing Act of 1967; initially this legislative act excluded non-citizens from 
trading goods such as maize, rice, and sugar in rural and non-central urban areas; the 
Kenya National Trading Corporation (KNTC) granted distribution rights to citizen 
wholesalers for these products (Swainson 1980: 187). In the 1970s the list of goods 
covered under the Trades Licensing Act was expanded to include salt, soap, shampoo, 
sweets, matches, batteries, insecticides, hardware, cement, wire, and tools (Ibid.: 187). In 
1975 the government amended the Trades Licensing Act so that all goods manufactured 
by foreign firms in Kenya had to be distributed through KNTC appointed citizen agents; 
the government granted a few exemptions for semi-finished products used as inputs in 
other industries as well as highly technical manufactured goods (Ibid.: 189). This policy 
had the effect of 'Africanizing' a greater percentage of the wholesale distribution of 
manufactured goods in Kenya. However, the policy was not without problems. Many 
established Asian traders had become Kenyan citizens and were able to qualify for trade 
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licenses (Leys 1975: 151). As a result, many of these Asian traders competed with 
Africans for trade licenses and prevented the desired level of Africanization in the sector 
that the government had hoped for. Furthermore, the Trades Licensing Act encouraged 
African traders to make profits through monopolizing the distribution of goods without 
adding any value to the goods being traded (Ibid.: 156). There was also tension between 
the government's policy of reducing imports in favour of local manufactures and the 
desires of African traders whom held trade licenses for imported goods, often the most 
lucrative and stable forms of trading available to African traders (Ibid.: 158). 
The government also enacted policies to increase the domestic production of 
manufactured goods as well as increase the percentage of African owned firms and 
Africans involved in management of foreign owned firms. One of the first significant 
state interventions in the industrial sector was the creation of the New Project Committee 
(NPC) in 1968. The NPC began reviewing all of the applications by foreign companies 
wanting to invest in Kenya. The NPC negotiated duty exemptions, percentages of 
government shareholding, Africanization of management, technical fees, and other state 
protections through import tariffs and other methods (Ogonda 1992: 304). 
The government developed the Industrial Estates Programme in 1968, in an effort 
to increase the number of Kenyan entrepreneurs involved in industrial production. 
Additionally the government wanted to establish industries that were believed to be 
essential for Kenya's development objectives (Fahnbulleh 2006: 39). The Industrial and 
Commercial Development Corporation (ICDC), the successor of the IDC, chose projects 
based on their potential for import substitution and their multiplier effect on industrial 
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development and training of technical personnel (Ibid.: 39). The ICDS select projects 
such as, "a foundry for the production of quality casting, diesel engines, pumps, 
agricultural implements, electric motors and generators; a plant for the manufacture of 
small lathes, bench drills and bench grinders; the manufacture of spare parts for cycles 
and automobiles; and the manufacture of sewing machines" (Ibid.: 39). 
The more interventionist approach by the state towards industrialization, through 
the policies mentioned, led to the government either wholly owning or holding a 
controlling interest in companies in almost every major industrial sector by the mid-
1970s. For example, in 1976 the government owned or had a controlling interest in 
companies in agricultural processing, power generation and distribution, oil refining, 
cement making, fertilizer manufacturing, mining, and textile manufacturing (Swainson 
1980: 246-47). In addition, the government also held a minority interest in companies 
involved in battery and electronics manufacturing, ceramics, plastics manufacturing, beer 
brewing, tire manufacturing, pulp and paper manufacturing, leather making, and shoe 
manufacturing (Ibid.: 248-49). 
The interventionist industrial policies pursued by the government during this 
period were successful in meeting some of the objectives set out in the development plan. 
Overall GDP grew at a rate of almost 6% per year between 1970-1975 and the 
manufacturing sector grew by over 7% per year during the same period (Sharpley & 
Lewis 1990: 207). There was also some success in Africanizing the industrial sector 
through the use of the Industrial Licensing Act, the approval of projects through the NPC, 
and the creation of the Industrial Estates Programme. 
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Although there were some policy successes during this period, there were also 
some fundamental shortcomings. For example, real wages in the manufacturing sector 
declined in Kenya between 1970 and 1975 compared with significant growth in real 
wages in the sector between independence and 1970 (Sharpley & Lewis 1990: 220-221). 
In addition, high unemployment persisted despite government attempts to address this 
problem through more rapid industrialization. Academics such as Raphael Kaplinsky and 
Steven Langdon also argued that Kenya failed to successfully Africanize the industrial 
sector and create an indigenous capitalist class independent from foreign capital; these 
criticisms became the source of much debate in the 1970s and early 1980s (Leys 1996: 
143-163). By the mid-1970s other more fundamental problems began to threaten Kenya's 
industrial model. 
In the mid to late 1970s Kenya was faced with significant challenges that forced 
the country to radically alter its industrial strategy. Initially, the government attempted to 
use more state-led intervention to address the challenges but a number of factors forced 
the government to abandon these policies. Chief among the challenges was a growing 
balance-of-payments deficit. The manufacturing sector was importing increasingly 
expensive machinery and the cost of importing oil was soaring due to the oil crisis of the 
1970s; the cost of importing oil increased to such an extent that 40% of Kenya's export 
earnings were used for purchasing petroleum (Miller & Yeager 1994: 128; Ogonda 1992: 
308). In contrast to the increasing price of imports, Kenya's revenues from its main 
export earners of tea and coffee remained relatively stagnant during the same period, 
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apart from a temporary coffee boom from 1976-1978 (Mwau & Handa 1995: 10; Ogonda 
1992: 308). 
The collapse of the East African Community (EAC) in 1977 further compounded 
Kenya's balance-of-payments deficit8. Prior to the break-up of the EAC, Kenyan 
manufacturers exported a significant proportion of their products to Uganda and 
Tanzania. However, after the collapse of the EAC, Kenyan manufacturers exported a 
fraction of what they had previously been exporting to these countries. The loss of these 
export markets for Kenyan manufacturers was a significant loss and Kenya lacked a large 
internal market to replace the demand. 
The government of Kenya responded to these challenges by taking a more radical 
and interventionist approach in the economy. For example, the government banned some 
imports in an effort to try and balance the trade deficit and restricted some overseas travel 
(Miller & Yeager 1994: 128). The boom in prices for coffee and tea from 1976 to 1978 
briefly reversed the country's growing deficit problem by dramatically increasing 
government revenues and foreign exchange reserves. This reversal in fortune spurred a 
significant jump in government social spending, an increase in external borrowing, and 
construction of new plants in the industrial sector (Ogonda 1992: 308). With renewed 
confidence from the commodity boom, the government announced an ambitious 
8 The EAC was established in 1967 to promote regional cooperation and integration between Kenya, 
Tanzania, and Uganda. Examples of regional initiatives under the EAC included the University of East 
Africa, East African Airways, and the East African Income Tax Department. However, the member 
countries of the EAC grew apart due to ideological differences and a belief on the part of Tanzania and 
Uganda that Kenya enjoyed an unfair trade advantage over them because of their more advanced 
economy and other strategic infrastructural advantages (Mugomba 1978: 264). 
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development plan for the years 1979-1983. Under the new political leadership of Daniel 
arap Moi, the plan called for the creation of one million new jobs, investment in new 
industries, and increased social spending to reduce poverty. However, the launch of the 
plan coincided with a dramatic drop in the price of coffee and tea, coupled with a 
decrease in agricultural production (Miller & Yeager 1994: 127-28). These events 
devastated the Kenyan economy and forced the country to abandon the industrial policies 
that it had pursued since independence. 
Structural Adjustment: Pressure to Reform 
The beginning of the 1980s marked a paradigmatic shift in industrial policy in 
Kenya due to the economic crisis that began in the 1970s. By 1980 inflation had reached 
20% and GDP growth had fallen to less than 3% in 1982; external debt also rose rapidly 
in the 1980s from 25% of GDP in 1980 to over 50% of GDP in 1987 (Adam, Cavendish, 
& Mistry 1992: 325). In addition, Western governments and IFIs began applying pressure 
on Kenya to limit state involvement in the industrial sector in favour of encouraging 
growth in the private sector.9 As a result of the economic constraints and external 
pressure from international lenders, Kenya scaled back many of the state interventionist 
policies that it pursued in the previous era. For example, the government halted the 
construction of new plants in the 1980s due to the inability to fund the projects, coupled 
9 See page 10 in Chapter 1 for a more in depth discussion of the shift in development ideology. 
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with a sharp rise in the price for imported machinery because of the Kenyan currency 
devaluation10. 
Although Kenya reduced state involvement in the industrial sector throughout the 
1980s, it never privatized the sector to the extent recommended by the World Bank, 
International Monetary Fund, and Western donor governments. The policy direction in 
the industrial sector throughout the decade was much more disjointed than the industrial 
policy pursued through the 1960s and 1970s. The government, on many occasions, 
officially committed to privatization and less intervention in the sector to guarantee 
structural adjustment loans; sometimes steps were taken to enact privatization policies. 
However, the government, in practice, often maintained the status quo and kept many of 
the state interventionist policies intact in the industrial sector by refusing to privatize 
parastatals and maintaining industrial licensing controls. 
The Moi government took its first significant step in addressing the economic 
crisis by commissioning a panel to investigate policy solutions led by economist and 
central bank director Philip Ndegwa (Miller & Yeager 1994: 129). The Ndegwa 
Commission recommended that the government should cut subsidies to industry and 
implement austerity measures to slash spending and reduce reliance on foreign borrowing 
(Ibid.: 129). At the same time, the IMF was recommending that Kenya should move 
away from ISI policies in favour of export promotion (Ibid.: 129). The government 
accepted the recommendations from both the Ndegwa Commission and the IMF, but the 
10 The Kenyan currency was devalued on advice from the World Bank in an effort to make Kenyan goods 
cheaper for export (Ogonda 1992: 308). 
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government only implemented some of the recommendations. For example, the 
government implemented some of the recommendations by sharply reducing the value of 
its currency to make exports cheaper through a series of devaluations until the currency 
was worth less than 1/3 of its value in 1990 than it was in 1980 (Ogonda 1992: 308). 
Furthermore, the government eased some of the quantitative restrictions on imports and 
abolished the sales tax on imported machinery (Fahnbulleh 2005: 275). However, the 
government was reticent to privatize industrial parastatals, in spite of pressure from the 
IMF and donor countries: "At mid-decade [1980s], parastatal corporations accounted for 
8 percent of GDP, 55 percent of public-sector capital formation, 31 percent of public 
employment, and 15 percent of formal-sector employment" (Miller & Yeager 1994: 141). 
Kenya continued its state intervention in the industrial sector with the belief that 
the government still had an important role to play in the sector; the government believed 
that the solution to the economic stagnation was a reform of some of the state-led 
interventionist policies instead of a complete withdrawal from the sector in favour of 
'free-market' solutions. A 1981 letter from then vice-president and finance minister of 
Kenya, Mwai Kibaki, to the regional World Bank vice-president explains why the 
government was resistant to widespread free-market reforms: 
With regards to your request that a firm timetable be established for 
carrying out further action towards trade liberalization, we are prepared to 
take selective steps in this direction, subject, however, to external 
uncertainties. Kenya's export potential is highly uncertain with respect to 
access to markets in neighbouring countries and European nations, in both 
of which economic growth and trade liberalization are doubtful features. 
In these circumstances specific commitments on trade liberalization by 
Kenya are hazardous undertakings (qtd. in Fahnbulleh 2005: 276). 
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The donor community continued to call for greater liberalization of the industrial sector 
in Kenya throughout the 1980s, often citing that the reason the economy was faltering 
was because of the inefficiencies of parastatals and state protected industries as well as 
rampant corruption within the sector and the government as a whole. 
Domestic manufacturers also accused the government of corruption. In the late 
1980s, manufacturers of a variety of products such as petroleum gas cylinders, farm 
machinery, and sisal bags all complained that illegal granting of import licenses by 
officials in exchange for bribes was hurting their ability to sell their products due to a 
flood of cheaper imports (Himbara 1994: 123-126). The sisal bag manufacturer collapsed 
as a result of the imports and 3000 workers were laid off and several hundred farmers in 
Kenya that supplied raw materials for the bags lost a major buyer (Ibid.: 126). However, 
the external donors and the indigenous manufacturers had different prescriptions for 
reforming industrial policy; the external donors wanted to abolish the domestic 
protections altogether, but the indigenous manufacturers believed that protection from 
import, in some cases, was necessary to foster a domestic manufacturing industry. The 
domestic manufacturers wanted a reform of the system to make it more efficient, but not 
necessarily a complete liberalization of the sector. In 1986 the Kenya Association of 
Manufacturers developed 8 critiques of Kenyan industrial development (Miller & Yeager 
1994: 141-42): 
1. There was underused industrial capacity and skills. 
2. Redundant investment was flowing into sectors with excess capacity. 
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3. Failure to move to production of intermediate inputs in line with a more advanced 
stage of ISI. 
4. Lack of a long-range vision on the part of planners for industrialization and 
development of technological capacity. 
5. The need to negotiate better terms with foreign investors and donors. 
6. The need to give good incentives to farmers to earn more foreign exchange. 
7. The inability of the government to promote local industry. 
8. The alliance of local monopolists and traders with some politicians adversely 
affecting industry. 
The critiques outlined above show that there were several issues with industrial 
policy, 
apart from corruption, and that the solutions for the stagnating sector was long term 
support for local manufacturers, using a variety of policies including protection, and 
detailed planning. The local manufacturers still wanted competition between firms and 
called for an end to monopolies in certain sectors but this was not the same position of 
the external donors whom wanted the entire sector liberalized and made to compete with 
global competitors. 
Although domestic manufacturers and external donors asked the government to 
reform the industrial sector, it continued with the same advance and retreat policies and 
failed to address the issue of corruption. The government often implemented 
liberalization in the industrial sector only to the extent that it would guarantee continued 
lending from donors, but stopped short of complete liberalization. 
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By the end of the 1980s Kenya's industrial sector was stagnant. Manufactures 
made up 12% of Kenya's exports in 1990, an increase of only 2% since 1965 (World 
Bank 1992: 248). The sector had failed to become competitive internationally even 
though the currency had been devalued significantly. Many Kenyan manufacturers, 
particularly in the shoe and textile sector, were also struggling to survive in the domestic 
market due to cheap imports (Miller & Yeager: 144). 
By the early 1990s Kenya's economy was in crisis: in 1992 and 1993 GDP 
growth was near zero, foreign currency reserves were almost depleted, the banking 
system was on the verge of collapse, and inflation reached a record high of 46% (Pape 
1996; Kenya National Bureau of Statistics 2008). As a result of the poor economic 
performance, Kenya was growing increasingly reliant on donor aid. The donor 
community used the increased reliance as an opportunity to force Kenya to implement 
radical reforms in the industrial sector and the broader economy as a whole. In 1991, the 
donor community suspended aid to Kenya and stated that it would not resume aid 
transfers unless the government adopted and implemented a comprehensive structural 
adjustment program (SAP) (FahnbuUeh 1995: 278-79). The SAP "called for a reduction 
in personnel in the civil service, the liquidation and/or privatization of most of Kenya's 
parastatal sector, the devaluation of the Kenyan shilling, and relaxation of the rules 
regarding repatriation of earnings by foreign investors" (Himbaral994: 151). After the 
suspension of aid, Kenya had two policy options: implement the SAP and resume aid 
transfers or reject the SAP and risk a complete economic collapse. Kenya chose the 
former option and embarked on a policy of widespread reform across many sectors; by 
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1995, the government cut 30,000 jobs in the civil service and a massive divestment of 
non-strategic parastatals was undertaken (Pape 1996). The government also implemented 
other reforms specific to the industrial sector: the government abolished import licensing, 
substantially reduced import tariffs, discontinued price controls on commodities, phased 
out foreign exchange controls, floated the exchange rate freely on international markets, 
and passed the Export Processing Act to encourage foreign direct investment in the 
manufacturing industry by granting a ten year corporate tax holiday to investors 
(Fahnbulleh 2005: 279-90). 
Despite the radical reforms, Kenya's macroeconomic performance for the 
remainder of the decade was mixed. GDP grew again between 1994 and 1996 but the 
economy entered another period of stagnation between 1997 and 2001, due in part to the 
suspension of loans by the IMF because of unmet conditions in the SAP with regard to 
governance reforms (UNDP 2001: 68; Hanmer et al 2003: 179). The manufacturing 
sector in Kenya also stagnated. Manufacturing as a percentage of GDP remained virtually 
unchanged from 1990-2000, it accounted for about 13% of GDP (Fahnbulleh 2005: 300). 
The underwhelming performance of the manufacturing sector in the 1990s is even more 
apparent when considering that the manufacturing sector accounted for 10.4% of GDP in 
1964 (Leys 1977: 277). 
Since 2000 the government's development policies have focused on poverty 
reduction through investments in education and health and reform of the economy to 
make it more open and attractive to foreign investment; industrial policy has mostly been 
focused on manufacturing for export. The government's industrial policies focus on FDI 
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in EPZ development with the intention that EPZs will spur the development of a more 
sophisticated manufacturing sector engaged in higher value added manufacturing (this 
will be discussed more thoroughly in the following chapter). The government has 
published two major development planning policies, also known as Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Papers (PRSPs). The first PRSP is the Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth 
and Employment Creation (2003-2007) and the second PRSP is Vision 2030 (2008-
2012). 
In 2003 the newly elected National Rainbow Coalition developed the first PRSP. 
The central objectives of the first PRSP are improved macroeconomic stability, increased 
access to education and health services, and improved governance (IMF 2005: v). The 
PRSP makes an explicit commitment to the private sector to meet Kenya's economic 
growth objectives: "the ERS [PRSP] commits to strengthening the macroeconomic 
framework, assuming a responsible fiscal stance, and providing a conducive environment 
for private sector investment in the productive sectors and, specifically, in infrastructure 
development and maintenance" (Ibid.: 1). The role of the state is one of facilitating 
private sector growth, through macroeconomic stability and investment in infrastructure, 
as opposed to the more active state interventions in the economy in the 1970s and 1980s. 
The PRSP states that, 
The [economic] strategy calls for redefining the role of the state as 
facilitator for private sector growth and investment. This will entail 
strengthening policy and regulatory functions of the state and transferring 
productive and service delivery activities to the private sector. Within this 
framework, the government commits to...implementing mechanisms for 
private sector participation in provision of infrastructural services, and 
establishing a competitive environment able to attract increased private 
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investment in productive sectors such as tourism, industry and trade (Ibid.: 
12). 
In specific reference to industry, the PRSP acknowledges that the manufacturing sector is 
performing below its potential. To address this problem the PRSP states that the 
government will consult with industry to make the sector as productive as possible 
through improved access to quality training, liberalizing trade, enhancing infrastructure 
and taking other steps to lower business costs (Ibid.: 50). However, the PRSP falls short 
of identifying specific goals for the industrial sector, such as listing priority 
manufacturing activities or setting specific targets for industrial sector growth. The PRSP 
set some targets for expanding the number of EPZs and improving backward linkages 
between textile manufacturers and the cotton industry but no specific numbers were 
given. The underlying assumption in the PRSP is that the private sector will attract the 
necessary investment in industry if the government provides the infrastructure to lower 
transaction costs and reduces barriers to trade. 
Vision 2030 is Kenya's second PRSP and serves as Kenya's development plan for 
2008-2012. The overall objective of Vision 2030 is to make Kenya a middle-income 
country by 2030. 
For the most part Vision 2030 is consistent with the policy objectives introduced in the 
previous PRSP. Vison 2030 is broken down into three main pillars for development: the 
economic pillar, the social pillar, and the political pillar. Under the economic pillar, a 
more detailed strategy for the manufacturing sector is developed compared to the 
previous PRSP. It recognizes that Kenya's manufacturing sector has continued to 
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stagnate but Vision 2030 is more prescriptive than the first PRSP by stating specifically 
that there needs to be an increase of locally manufactured goods for the domestic market: 
"the share of Kenyan products is only 7 per cent of the US $11 billion regional market. 
The Eastern African market is dominated by imports from outside the region. This is an 
indication that there is a large potential to improve Kenya's competitiveness in the region 
by replacing external suppliers gradually" (Ministry of Planning and National 
Development 2007: 60). Furthermore, Vision 2030 states that, "Weak enforcement of 
standards and of tax laws has led to dumping of sub-standard imports and counterfeit 
goods into the domestic market, making it unfavourable for local manufacturers to 
compete" (Ibid.: 62). The language sounds similar to some of the arguments made in 
favour of state-supported import substitution policies of the 1960s and 1970s. However, 
Vision 2030 is devoid of any state interventionist policies in the manufacturing sector 
such as tariff protection, state financing of industry, or tougher laws to address dumping 
of sub-standard imports and counterfeit goods. Vision 2030's policies for improving 
manufacturing performance consist of improving infrastructure such as highways, rail, 
ports, and energy distribution systems; boosting investment in science and technology 
research; and implementing efficiency-enhancing institutional reforms (Ibid.: 63). Apart 
from the stated goal of increasing Kenya's share of the regional market, the rest of the 
manufacturing policies in Vision 2030 emphasize the need to expand EPZs and transition 
them to SEZs. This will be discussed more thoroughly in the next chapter. 
Despite the renewed emphasis on manufacturing in Vision 2030, the sector 
continues to underperform and has failed to significantly improve its share of GDP, 
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create more jobs, and move higher up the value chain. Despite these shortcomings the 
government remains firmly committed to export promotion policies and increased 
liberalization of the sector. Alternative state-led industrial policies are explicitly omitted. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown how Kenya's industrialization policies shifted from state-
led industrialization in the 1960s and 1970s to market-led industrialization in the 1980s 
and 1990s largely due to pressure from Western country donors, the World Bank, and the 
IMF in the form of SAPs. Kenya started with a significant industrial base at 
independence, compared to other African countries, and the sector grew significantly 
through the 1960s and 1970s using state-led industrial policies. However the sector's 
share of GDP has remained virtually unchanged since the 1980s. The World Bank and 
donor countries have effectively reduced the space for the state to intervene in the 
industrial sector by pushing for the elimination of tariffs, divestment of parastatals, and 
liberalization of the market. The government of Kenya has adopted and implemented 
many of these policies despite recommendations from local manufacturers asking for 
some protection and strategic state involvement in the sector. The transformation from 
state-led industrialization to market-led industrialization is particularly relevant to EPZ 
development because the EPZ program represents a steadfast commitment by the 
government of Kenya to neo-classical economic principles that prioritizes free movement 
of private capital in and out of the country, low transaction costs, and the reduction of 
barriers to global trade; although it should be noted that the government has subsidized 
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the EPZ program heavily in an effort to attract FDI (this will be discussed in more detail 
in the following chapter). Nonetheless, the government's commitment to neo-classical 
economics has achieved little in stimulating the domestic manufacturing sector. 
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Chapter 3 
Export Processing Zones in Kenya 
This chapter shows how EPZs in Kenya fail to achieve increases in exports and 
diversification into higher value products, closer linkages with domestic manufacturers, 
and increases in the quantity and quality of employment in the formal sector. This chapter 
discusses each of these objectives separately using data and figures from the Government 
of Kenya, the EPZA, and a variety of other sources. Furthermore, this chapter shows how 
the Kenyan EPZs are part of a neo-liberal global trading system, through AGOA, that 
prioritizes open market access, reduction of state intervention in the market, and an 
industrial policy that favours foreign private capital over state supported domestic 
manufacturers. 
The chapter consists of five sections. The first section is a brief overview of EPZ 
development in Kenya. The purpose of presenting an overview is to provide the reader 
with a greater understanding of the overall structure of the EPZ program in Kenya. The 
second section consists of data analysis on the impact that EPZs are having on exports. 
The third section discusses the linkages between domestic manufacturers and EPZ firms. 
The fourth section presents and analyzes data on employment in EPZs. The fifth section 
considers the future of the EPZ program and its implications for industrialization in 
Kenya. 
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EPZ Development Overview 
The government of Kenya established the EPZ program in 1990. EPZs consist of 
privately funded EPZs as well as publicly funded EPZs; the publicly funded EPZs are 
owned by the EPZA on land that was bought and serviced by the government, and the 
buildings on the land are leased to private firms. The largest EPZ is the publicly funded 
Athi River EPZ near Nairobi. It was completed in 1997 at a cost of US$30 million and 
was financed with a loan from the World Bank covering 80% of the cost; the government 
of Kenya financed the remaining 20% of the cost (EPZA 2011). The Athi River EPZ 
hosts 34 firms and employs over 8000 people (EPZA 2010: Table 4). The other publicly 
funded EPZ, Kipevu, near the port of Mombassa, is much smaller in size; as of 2009 (the 
latest date for which data is available) Kipevu hosts 3 firms and employs 30 workers 
(Ibid.). The remaining 29 EPZs are privately funded; most of these zones host only one 
firm and the largest, Sameer Industrial Park, hosts six firms and employs nearly 4000 
people (Ibid.). The following table shows that the Athi River EPZ has the greatest 
number of firms, employs the most people, and has the greatest value of exports. 
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Alpha Logistics Services EPZ Ltd 
Ashton Apparels EPZ Ltd(Coast Industrial Park) 
Athi River EPZ Ltd 
Ayman Industrial Park EPZ Ltd 
Comarco Properties EPZ Ltd 
De La Rue Currency and Security print EPZ Ltd 
Emirates Agencies EPZ Ltd (Changamwe) 
Erdemann EPZ Ltd 
Gold Crown Foods EPZ Ltd 
Hurlingham Group EPZ Ltd 
Indigo EPZ Ltd (in receivership) 
Kenya Fluorspar EPZ Ltd 
Kingorani EPZ Ltd 
Kipevu EPZ Ltd 
Malory Investments EPZ Ltd 
Mazeras EPZ Ltd 
Mistry Jadva Parbat EPZ Ltd 
Mvita Industrial Park EPZ Ltd 
Olivado EPZ Ltd 
Penguin Paper & Book Co EPZ Ltd 
P.J Dave EPZ Ltd 
Plastic Compounders EPZ Ltd 
Pwani Industrial Park EPZ Ltd - Changamwe (Kapric) 
Pwani Industrial Park EPZ Ltd - Miritini (Formerly 
Birch) 
Sameer Industrial Park EPZ Ltd 
Saw Africa EPZ Ltd 
Sunflag EPZ Ltd (Road C, Ind. Area) 
Sunflag EPZ Ltd(Runyenjes Road, Ind.Area) 
Wildlife Works EPZ Ltd 
Zois EPZ Ltd (Miritini) 







































































































Source: EPZA 2009, pg. 14-16 
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The EPZ program offers a number of incentives to investors. Tax benefits include 
a ten year corporate tax holiday and 25% tax thereafter (the current proposal is to reduce 
this to 15% after the tax holiday); ten year withholding tax holiday on dividends and 
other remittances for non-resident parties; exemption from Value Added Tax (VAT) and 
customs import duty on inputs; and 100% investment deduction on investments in new 
buildings and machinery (EPZA 2011). Other incentives include reduced times for 
project approvals and fewer bureaucratic procedures; no exchange controls; and serviced 
land and pre-built factory buildings available for sale or lease (Ibid.). 
Although the EPZ program has been in existence since 1990, it only began to 
receive significant foreign investment after 2000, because of the implementation of the 
African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA); AGOA is a US trade act with Sub-
Saharan African countries that guarantees preferential access to the US market for a 
number of African products. In order to qualify for AGOA, Sub-Saharan African 
countries must meet a number of conditions. The President of the US deems countries 
eligible, 
If they are determined to have established, or are making continual 
progress toward establishing the following: market-based economies; the 
rule of law and political pluralism; elimination of barriers to U.S. trade 
and investment; protection of intellectual property; efforts to combat 
corruption; policies to reduce poverty, increasing availability of health 
care and educational opportunities; protection of human rights and worker 
rights; and elimination of certain child labor practices (International Trade 
Administration 2011). 
The US granted AGOA eligibility to Kenya in 2000, allowing the country barrier-free 
access to the US market for a number of products; the most important products for 
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Kenya, in relation to EPZs, are textile products. After Kenya was granted AGOA 
eligibility, many Asian investors constructed manufacturing facilities in Kenyan EPZs to 
produce textile products because many Asian countries, at the time, had quota limits on 
the export of textiles to the US as part of the Multi-Fibre Agreement (MFA)1 J. 
AGOA is significant, not only because it provides Kenya with a market for export 
products, but also because it represents Kenya's commitment to neo-classical economics. 
AGOA represents the continuation of external pressure on the Kenyan government to 
reform its economy by reducing state intervention; the reward is access to the US 
economy. In EPZs, the largest beneficiaries of this agreement are EPZ firms, the majority 
of which are foreign owned, shipping textile products to the US, paying zero tax to the 
Kenyan government under the tax incentive arrangement, and repatriating their profits 
without penalty. 
Exports and EPZs 
One of the principal objectives of the EPZ program in Kenya is to diversify and 
increase exports (EPZA 2011). The data in this section shows that the contribution from 
EPZs to overall exports has been limited, and that export products manufactured by EPZ 
firms have failed to significantly diversify into higher value products; the majority of the 
11 The Multi-Fibre Agreement (MFA) provided for the application of selective quantitative restrictions 
when surges in imports, particularly textiles, threatened to damage the industry of the importing country; 
the MFA began a phase-out process starting on 1 January 1995 and was replaced by the World Trade 
Organization Agreement on Textiles and Clothing. The phase-out process culminated in the complete 
removal of all quantitative restrictions on textile and clothing imports in 2005 (World Trade Organization 
2011). 
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products are made up of textiles and apparel. Furthermore, the value of exports in the 
textile sector has fallen since the peak in 2004. 
This section is divided into three parts. First, an analysis of macroeconomic data 
provides a brief overview of Kenya's overall exports to show which products constitute 
the majority of exports. Secondly, I examine EPZ export data in relation to overall 
exports to show its impact on total export value. Additionally, I present trends in export 
volumes in the EPZ sector as well as trends in the types of exports being produced to 
show which products are being produced and exported from EPZs. Finally, there is an 
overall evaluation of the impact that the EPZ program has made in diversifying and 
increasing exports. 
Kenya's exports grew steadily in the last decade with the exception of 2009, the 
year the global economic recession began (See table 3.2). 
Table 3.2 Kenya's Annual % Growth in Exports of Goods and Services 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
% Growth 1 13 
Source: World Bank 201 lc 
Most of Kenya's export growth has come from the export of commodities such as tea and 
horticultural products (cut flowers), as opposed to manufactured goods. In 2009 the top 
three export products by value were tea, horticultural products, and coffee respectively; 
these three exports accounted for almost half of the value of all exports (Kenya National 
Bureau of Statistics 2010: 124). 
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However, export growth has not kept pace with the growth in imports, resulting in 
a significant trade deficit (See table 3.3). 



























Source: Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 2010, pg. 118 
The majority of Kenyan imports are made up of industrial supplies, fuel, 
machinery and capital equipment, and transport equipment (Ibid.: 132). The value of 
imported goods such as private automobiles, electronics, clothing, and other consumer 
goods is also growing in step with Kenya's burgeoning middle class. This means that a 
growing number of manufactured goods are being imported into Kenya and the growth in 
value of these imports is much higher than the growth in value of Kenya's exports which 
continue to be dominated by raw commodities. This type of growing trade imbalance is 
not a new phenomenon; it has been a problem in developing countries for decades and 
was a major reason that countries implemented ISI policies in the 1950s and 1960s. 
In 2009 EPZs in Kenya accounted for 1.92% of GDP in Kenya and represented 
6.94% of the value of all exports; the EPZs also accounted for 3.63% of all 
manufacturing (EPZA 2010). 
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Source: EPZA 2009, pg. 29 
The data in Table 3.4 show that EPZs are in a downward trend in relation to their 
contribution to Kenya's total exports, contribution to the overall manufacturing sector, 
and contribution to GDP. There are two main factors that explain the underperformance 
of EPZs in relation to exports and a secondary factor that has contributed to this trend. 
The first major factor contributing to the downward trend of EPZs in relation to 
exports, the manufacturing sector, and GDP is the US economic recession that began in 
2008 and continued throughout 2009; GDP decreased by 2.6% from 2008 to 2009 in the 
US (IMF 2011). The US recession had the effect of reducing demand for clothing and 
textiles from Kenyan EPZs. Goods sent to the US under the African Growth and 
Opportunity Act (AGOA) trade agreement account for 54% of exports from the EPZs; 
98.1% of these were garment products (Ibid.: 31-32). The economic recession negatively 
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affected demand for clothing and other garment products in the US and this is reflected in 
the marked drop in exports from 2008 to 2009 in Kenya's EPZs (See Table 3.4). 
The second major factor contributing to the underperformance of exports in the 
EPZs is the expiration of the Multi-Fibre Agreement (MFA) in 2005. The MFA imposed 
quotas on the quantity of textile products and garments that could be exported from 
developing countries to developed countries. The MFA worked in favour of Kenya 
because it was exempt from the quotas, but low cost and high volume producers of textile 
products, located in countries such as China, were limited in the quantity of textile 
products that they could ship to developed countries. The protection of Kenya from lower 
cost producers allowed the textile industry in Kenya to thrive. Many firms constructed 
textile factories in Kenyan EPZs to take advantage of the quota exemption. However, 
when the MFA expired in 2005, member countries of the World Trade Organization 
lifted quota restrictions and many firms closed their operations in Kenya due to increased 
competition from lower cost production facilities in Asian countries such as China, 
Bangladesh, Cambodia, and Vietnam (Ibid.: 37). Compared to the rapid growth of the 
EPZ sector from 2002-2004, performance of the sector has remained relatively stagnant 
from 2004-2009 as a result of the expiration of the MFA (See table 3.4). The textile 
sector, specifically, has shown steady declines in export value since 2004 (See table 3.5). 
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Table 3.5 Selected Indicators for Garment Manufacturers in Kenyan EPZs 
Year 
Number of Enterprises 
Investment (Kshs 
million) 
Exports (Kshs million) 
Quantity of exports 
(million pieces) 

















































Source: EPZA 2010, pg. 24 
The third factor that has negatively impacted EPZ performance is the high cost of 
energy for manufacturing firms. The problem becomes particularly acute when water 
levels drop in hydroelectric dams due to drought. For example, 2009 was an abnormally 
dry year in Kenya and hydroelectric power generation dropped by 35% compared to the 
previous year (Ibid.: 7). Kenya increased the amount of thermal generated power to make 
up for the shortfall but the cost of thermal power generation is significantly higher than 
hydroelectric power. Increases in costs were passed on to consumers including heavy 
users such as manufacturing firms. EPZ firms cite high costs for electricity, compared to 
other countries, as one of the reasons they are unable to remain competitive (Ibid.: 2). 
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The data from this section has shown that EPZs have failed to significantly 
increase manufactured exports from Kenya and they have also failed to diversify into 
manufactured products higher in the value chain. The majority of exports are made up of 
textiles, and this sector is performing poorly due to increased competitive pressure from 
lower cost Asian manufacturers. These findings support the argument that EPZ firms are 
dependent on low cost production that can easily be relocated to jurisdictions with lower 
cost structures. 
Linkages Between Domestic Firms and EPZs 
Linkages and technology transfer between domestic firms and EPZs is another 
core economic objective of the EPZ program (EPZA 2011). The government suggests 
that EPZ firms will stimulate manufacturing by local firms by using local inputs and 
transferring technology from EPZ firms to domestic firms. However, this section shows 
that there are few linkages between domestic firms and EPZ firms because most of the 
inputs used by EPZ manufacturers are sourced from outside the country. Furthermore, 
plans to allow EPZ firms to sell more of their product in the domestic market may 
threaten domestic manufacturers because they do not receive the same government 
subsidies and are therefore placed at a competitive disadvantage. 
In 2009 local expenditures by EPZ firms totaled just over 11 billion Ksh, a 3.1% 
decrease from 2008 (EPZA 2010: 40; Kenya National Bureau of Statistics 2010: 206); 
this is equivalent to 142 million US using the average annual exchange rate from 2009 
(Ibid.: 117). Local expenditures include "the amount of resources spent by EPZ 
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enterprises in purchase of local goods and services, purchase of capital goods, salaries for 
local employees, electricity, telephone, water, rent, transport, and all other local costs" 
(Ibid.: 206). 
Local wages alone accounted for nearly 3.3 billion Ksh spent locally in 2009 
(EPZA 2010: 33); this represents almost 30% of total local expenditures. Other 
significant local costs for EPZ firms are electricity, water, and transport. Kenya's overall 
GDP in 2009 was 1.4 trillion Ksh (18 billion US). 
The actual expenditures by EPZ firms on locally sourced inputs is a difficult 
figure to calculate because it is not disaggregated from total local expenditures by EPZ 
firms in the 2009 annual report. However, when large local expenditures such as wages, 
utilities, and transportation are factored out, it is reasonable to hypothesize that the 
number spent on domestic raw materials and manufactured inputs becomes much less 
significant which suggests that the linkages between firms in EPZs and domestic 
manufacturers are weak. An example that supports the hypothesis that links between 
EPZs and domestic manufacturers are weak, is the lack of local materials used in the 
production of textile products in EPZs. This is a useful example because textile firms in 
the EPZs account for over half of all EPZ exports by value, nearly half of all sales, and 
over 30% of local expenditures (Ibid.: 20). However, textile firms source cotton, one of 
the most important raw materials in textile production, primarily from countries outside 
of Kenya. Cotton production in Kenya peaked in the mid-1980s at 70,000 bales of lint, 
but Kenya produced only 23,000 bales in 2009 (Ondari 2010; Wahome 2011). As a 
result, Kenya does not have the capacity to meet the demand for cotton from textile 
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manufacturers in EPZs. Many textile firms in the EPZs can secure cheaper cotton from 
outside the country. However, starting in 2012, Kenya will be required to source all 
cotton in US destined textile products locally or from the US as part of the AGOA 
agreement. The government of Kenya and local cotton producers are attempting to revive 
the cotton industry in Kenya to meet source requirements for AGOA, but it is not certain 
if Kenya will be able to source all of the cotton required in EPZ textile production to 
meet these requirements. Furthermore, given the challenges facing textile manufacturers 
in Kenyan EPZs such as increased competition from Asian manufacturers, declining 
number of textile firms, and declining value of textile exports (see table 3.5), there may 
not be a long-term market for local cotton producers attempting to sell their product to 
EPZ firms. The local cotton industry might be better off focusing its long-term strategy 
on the domestic and regional market as opposed to export markets if the current trends in 
EPZ textile production continue. 
Foreign ownership of EPZ firms is another factor that affects domestic firms as 
well as the Kenyan economy. As mentioned earlier, foreign owned firms enjoy generous 
tax incentives as well as other benefits such as unlimited repatriation of profits. This 
means that foreign owned firms contribute less to the economy because a smaller 
percentage of foreign investors are likely to re-invest their profits in the domestic 
economy compared to domestically held firms. Foreign ownership of firms has declined 
in relation to domestic firms, but the majority of firms are still foreign owned. In 2009, 
56.6% of firms were foreign owned, 19.3% of firms were wholly Kenyan owned, and 
24.1% of firms were joint ventures between Kenyan and foreign investors (EPZA 2010). 
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In an effort to increase the number of domestic manufacturers in EPZs, the EPZA 
has recently launched a program called the EPZ Business Incubation Programme. The 
objective of this program is to nurture small Kenyan (minimum 75% Kenyan owned) 
export-oriented enterprises into medium and large enterprises within four years of being 
admitted to the program (EPZA 2008). In order to qualify for the program, domestic 
manufacturers must meet several requirements such as operating in target sectors of 
horticultural/food processing, commercial crafts, textiles and apparels, or information 
technology; demonstrate business knowledge and entrepreneurial expertise; operate in a 
sector with high growth potential; plan to have an 80% export oriented business within 
four years of locating in the business incubator; and employ a labour force of fewer than 
100 (Ibid.). The incentives for firms taking part in this program include a 10 year 
corporate tax holiday; duty and value added tax exemptions on raw materials, machinery 
and other inputs; financing assistance; marketing assistance; and other business 
development support services (Ibid.). The first phase of this project is fully leased with 
two firms operational and 4 projects approved in total; currently construction is underway 
on the second phase of the project (Ibid.). However, the project is still in its infancy and it 
is difficult to determine if it will address the broader objectives of the EPZ such as 
increasing exports, long-term employment creation, and more technologically advanced 
manufacturing. 
Despite efforts by the EPZA to increase linkages by implementing the Business 
Incubation Programme, recent developments suggest that tensions are increasing between 
EPZ firms and non-EPZ domestic firms. EPZ firms want to sell more of their product in 
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the domestic market, due to increasing competition on the international market, and 
domestic manufacturers believe that tax incentives given to EPZ firms constitute an 
unfair advantage. In 2009 the domestic market accounted for 9% of total sales by EPZ 
firms (EPZA 2010: 40). However, the EPZA wants to increase the share of domestic 
sales by EPZ firms to 70% of total sales and eliminate the 2.5% duty charged on goods 
sold by EPZ firms in the domestic market (Wahome 2010). Betty Maina, the chief 
executive officer of the Kenya Association of Manufacturers (KAM), the organization 
representing local manufacturers, stated that, "They [EPZ firms] enjoy tax holidays 
besides other tax exemptions, reduced import duty and waivers meant to promote exports. 
If these people are allowed to off-load their products in the same market we operate in, it 
would give them undue advantage" (as cited in Wahome 2010). According to the EPZA, 
foreign owned EPZ firms have threatened to relocate their operations, when their contract 
expires, if they are not given greater access to the local market (Ibid.). 
Allowing EPZ firms to increase their domestic sales to 70% is a significant 
departure from the traditional EPZ model. The purpose of an EPZ is to manufacture for 
export not for domestic consumption. Pitting EPZ firms against local manufacturers for 
the domestic market could undermine the objective of developing strong linkages 
between EPZ and non-EPZ firms and furthermore it has the potential to drive local 
manufacturing firms out of business. 
Overall this section has shown that linkages between EPZ firms and local 
manufacturing firms are weak because many of the inputs used in EPZ production are 
sourced from foreign producers. Although cotton production is set to increase in Kenya, 
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in an effort to supply EPZ textile firms, this increased production may not be used by 
EPZ firms if textile production continues to decline or if cheaper cotton can be secured 
abroad. Lastly, domestic manufacturers may be weakened by EPZ firms if they are forced 
to compete head to head for domestic market share, especially if the tax incentives and 
government subsidies enjoyed by EPZ firms are not extended to domestic manufacturers. 
Employment in EPZs 
The purpose of discussing employment in EPZs is to show the extent to which 
EPZs are meeting the government's objective of creating employment in manufacturing. 
From the inception of the EPZ program, the government has maintained that creating 
employment is one of the primary objectives of the program. In an effort to evaluate the 
effectiveness of this objective, this section of the data chapter consists of three 
components. The first component provides a brief overview of employment in Kenya 
with regard to labour by sector, employment growth in the formal and informal sector, 
and key issues in employment creation. The second component examines the 
performance of the EPZ program with regard to the number of jobs that have been 
created as well as the quality of these jobs in terms of wages and other qualitative factors. 
Finally, there is an overall evaluation of the employment creation strategy in the EPZ 
program. 
The government of Kenya consistently lists employment creation as one of its key 
objectives in development planning. The PRSP for 2003-2007 listed job creation of 
500,000 jobs annually as one of its central macroeconomic objectives (IMF 2005: 3). 
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However, rapid population growth in Kenya means that roughly 500,000 people join the 
labour force annually; the result is that the creation of new jobs is barely able to keep up 
with the growth in the labour force and the unemployment rate remains high (Manda 
2004: 32). The majority of employment growth in Kenya is in the informal sector; the 
activities in this sector consist mainly of "manufacturing, building and construction, 
distributive trades, transport and communication, and community and personal services 
industries" (KNBS 2010: 78). In 1988 20% of employment, excluding small scale 
agriculture, was in the informal sector; in 1992 the informal sector accounted for 44.9% 
of employment; in 1996 it was 61.1%; and in 2000 it was 70.4% (Manda 2004: 25). In 
2009, the informal sector accounted for nearly 80% of employment, employing 8.3 
million people (KNBS 2010: 69). Within the informal sector, wholesale trade, retail 
trade, hotels, and restaurants accounted for the majority of employment, employing 4.9 
million people (Ibid.: 79). Manufacturing was the second largest employer, employing 
nearly 1.8 million people (Ibid.). This type of manufacturing is generally made up of 
small enterprises engaged in furniture making, small engine repair, welding, sewing, and 
other small scale manufacturing. 
The substantial growth in employment in the informal sector in comparison with 
the formal sector means that employment has become less secure, labour standards are 
more difficult to enforce, and the potential for union organization in the workplace has 
been eroded. 
Employment in the formal manufacturing sector has remained stagnant since the 
1970s and many domestic manufacturers are unable to compete with cheap imported 
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goods and have been forced to cease operations, shrink the labour force, or casualize 
employment to stay competitive (Ibid.: 12). 
One of the central objectives of the EPZ program is to increase formal sector 
employment. In the early 2000s EPZs achieved substantial yearly increases in 
employment due to the growing number of textile firms locating in them. The growth in 
EPZ employment was a direct result of the AGOA agreement between the US and 
Kenya, as discussed in the previous section. However, after the expiration of the MFA in 
2005, steady yearly declines in EPZ employment ensued due to increased competition 
from lower cost textile firms in Asian countries (See table 3.6). The number of garment 
manufacturing firms operating in the EPZ decreased from a high of 35 in 2003 to 19 in 
2009 (table 3.5). 











































Source: EPZA 2010 
The textile sector continues to account for the majority of employment in EPZs, despite 
the decrease in the number of firms in this sector. Out of the 30,623 employees in the 
EPZs, nearly 80% worked in the textile sector in 2009 (EPZA 2010: 24). The proportion 
of EPZ employment in relation to overall manufacturing employment has also declined 
steadily since 2003. In 2003, EPZ employment accounted for nearly 16% of all 
manufacturing employment in Kenya and in 2009 it fell to 11.5% (Ibid.: 28). The 
employment data suggests that the EPZ program is failing to create employment in other 
sectors to offset the loss of jobs in textiles. 
Apart from the overall decline in employment, wage rates have failed to keep 
pace with inflation. The EPZA 2009 Annual Report states that average monthly wages 
have increased from Kshs 5,233 in 2003 to Kshs 9,059 in 2009, representing a 73.1% 
increase (Ibid.: 33). This wage is slightly higher than wages in the manufacturing sector 
as a whole which average about Kshs 8000 per month (KNBS 2010: 77). However, it 
should be noted that most jobs in Kenya's manufacturing sector are in the informal sector 
and generally pay less than the formal sector. The wage increase in the EPZA 2009 
Annual Report also fails to take into account the average annual inflation rate in Kenya 
1 >y 
based on the Consumer Price Index (CPI) . According to the World Bank, Kenya's 
annual inflation rate from 2003-2009 was nearly 12% (World Bank 201 lb). The report 
does not mention the inflation rate in any of its wage statistics, even though this is a 
factor that must be considered when comparing such data. Kenya's overall wage rate, 
after factoring in inflation, decreased by 10.2% in 2008 and decreased again by 4.2% in 
The Consumer Price Index shows the annual percentage change in the cost to an average consumer for 
purchasing a fixed basket of goods and services. In Kenya the basket of goods is made up of 12 categories 
assigned different values (the sum of all values equals 100) to reflect how much the average consumer 
spends on each category. For example, in 2011 food and non-alcoholic beverages were assigned the 
highest value (36.04); the second highest value is housing, water, electricity, gas, and other fuels (18.3); 
Transport (8.66); Clothing and footwear (7.43); Household furnishings, equipment, and maintenance 
(6.16); Miscellaneous (4.52); Restaurants and hotels (4.48); Communication (3.82); Education (3.14); 
Health (3.13); Recreation & Culture (2.25); and Alcohol, tobacco, and narcotics (2.06). Values in each 
category are generally reviewed yearly to reflect changes in average consumer trends (Kenya National 
Bureau of Statistics 2011). 
2009 (KNBS 2010: 78). The following table shows the wage data from the report and 
also includes the annual inflation rate based on the CPI. 



































































Source: EPZA 2009, pg. 33; World Bank 201 lb 
To put these numbers in perspective, table 3.4 compares the actual wage increase with the 
2003 wage, if it were adjusted for yearly inflation, using inflation rates from table 3.7. 
Table 3.8 shows that the actual wage increase has not kept pace with inflation, 
particularly after 2006. The 2003 wage, after adjusting for annual inflation, would be 
over Kshs 2000 per month higher than the 2009 wage. 
Table 3.8 EPZ Monthly Wage Increase and 2003 Monthly Wage Adjusted for Annual 
Inflation 
Year 
Average Monthly Local 
Wage (Kshs) 























Source: EPZA 2009, pg. 33; World Bank 201 lb 
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The widening gap between the increase in inflation and the increase in wages for locals 
suggests that employees in the EPZs are less able to purchase goods and services because 
their wage increases are not keeping pace with average price increases for basic 
necessities. 
The decrease in real wages also suggests that EPZ firms are failing to move into 
manufacturing higher in the production chain. Generally, more skill intensive and 
complex manufacturing processes result in higher wages due to the production of higher 
value products, but this has not been the case in Kenyan EPZs. 
In addition to the decrease in overall employment and the gap between wage 
increases and annual inflation, the quality of employment in EPZs is another factor that 
needs to be taken into consideration when evaluating the objective of employment 
creation. The introduction to this section mentioned increasing casualization as one of the 
major trends in overall employment in Kenya and EPZs have experienced a similar trend. 
The growing use of casual labour in EPZs has negatively affected employees because 
fewer of them are working as full-time labourers and enjoying the benefits associated 
with it. The number of casual workers versus permanent full-time workers is not 
published by the EPZA. However, qualitative data collected, by the author, through 
interviews, informal conversations, and discussions with current and former EPZ workers 
as well as various officials confirms that there is growing use of casual employment in 
EPZs. Although the various sources agree that casual labour in EPZs exists, they differ in 
their reasoning about why this is happening. In an interview, conducted by the author 
with an EPZA communications officer in August 2010, the interviewee admitted that the 
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use of casual labour was an ongoing challenge in EPZ firms. The reason that many firms 
used casual labourers, according to the officer, was that textile firms had large 
fluctuations for orders at specific times of the year requiring significantly more labour 
than other times of the year (Ibid.). These order fluctuations meant that textile firms 
needed to employ casual labourers to meet higher seasonal production targets to meet 
increased demand in countries like the USA for peak shopping periods such as Christmas. 
When production orders declined, the textile firms laid off the casual labourers. However, 
EPZ workers provided a different explanation for the increase in casual labour. 
A former EPZ worker and shop steward with the Tailors and Textiles Workers 
Union (TTWU), during an interview with the author in August 2010, stated that the use 
of casual labour was a tool used by management to keep employees from joining the 
TTWU. The former EPZ worker said that prior to unionization in 2003/2004 most 
employees in the factories were full-time and permanent; however, after unionization 
textile firms began hiring more casual labourers; labourers were hired for less than three 
months and then laid off because, after three months, workers would no longer be on 
probation and the textile firms had to recognize them as permanent employees. Textile 
firms are required to pay a higher wage and provide more benefits to workers with 
permanent full-time status as opposed to casual labourers, thereby increasing production 
costs. Other conversations with workers and former workers confirmed the same trend 
with regard to casual employment. One EPZ worker explained that many labourers move 
from firm to firm every three months because they are unable to attain full-time and 
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permanent employment. This trend was also found in focus group studies with EPZ 
workers conducted by LARC in the spring of 2010. 
Another issue raised by workers and former workers in interviews and 
conversations was the use of production targets. These production targets were set by the 
firm and each worker was required to produce a certain amount of pieces per hour. Many 
workers felt that the production targets were unreasonably high because they were not 
able to meet their production targets in the time that they were allotted. The result was 
that many workers stayed overtime to meet their production targets but they were not 
paid overtime by the firm unless their targets had already been met. Workers suggested 
that this was another reason that firms preferred to use casual workers because it 
prevented workers from unionizing and taking grievances about overtime pay to the 
TTWU. 
Although the perspectives on the use of casual employment differ, the fact that 
casual employment persists is problematic from a development perspective. Casual 
employment is less secure than full-time permanent employment and this hinders the 
ability of workers to save and invest. Furthermore, casual employees are less able to 
organize and collectively bargain for better wages and benefits. 
Overall, the EPZ program has performed poorly in meeting its objective of 
creating employment. The number of employees in the sector is declining, wage rates 
have not kept pace with inflation, and growing use of casual employees is leading to 
insecure employment. These findings suggest that the implementation of neo-classical 
economic theory, in the case of Kenya's EPZ program, has failed to create the type of 
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employment that it predicted. The World Bank stated that EPZs represented the first rung 
on a ladder toward higher value manufacturing and higher wage employment (World 
Bank 1995: 62). The government of Kenya embraced this view by offering generous tax 
incentives to attract FDI in EPZs in the hope that it would stimulate investment in 
manufacturing and lead to substantial increases in formal employment; the World Bank 
fully supported this initiative by financing 80% of the costs of creating Kenya's largest 
publicly funded EPZ in Ami River (EPZA 2011). However, after over a decade of EPZ 
development, there has been little diversification away from low skill textile and apparel 
manufacturing. The employment benefits originally envisioned have failed to materialize. 
The Future of EPZs 
The EPZA and the Government of Kenya are aware of the failure to meet the 
objectives of the EPZ program. The EPZA 2009 Annual Report lists several challenges of 
the EPZ program. The challenges listed include, barriers to selling goods on the domestic 
market; the global economic recession; increased competition from Asian producers; 
1 ^ 
expiry of third country fabric provision under AGOA ; high cost of electricity for 
manufacturers; high wages for employees compared to Asian producers; and delays in 
importing raw materials and exporting goods due to port delays (2010: 37-38). The EPZA 
makes 11 recommendations for addressing these challenges (Ibid.: 38-40): 
1. Consistency in Policy. 
13 The expiry of this provision requires all textile firms in the EPZ to source fabric from Kenya or the US by 
September 30, 2012 for all US bound textile products. 
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2. A reduction in electricity rates charged to EPZ firms through government subsidy. 
3. Duty on EPZ sales to domestic market based on the value of imports for a product 
as opposed to the price of the finished product. 
4. Elimination of Value Added Tax on oil purchased by distributors that is sold to 
EPZ firms. 
5. Increase of domestic sales to 70% for EPZ firms and elimination of 2.5% duty on 
locally sold products. 
6. Reduction of corporate tax to 15% after tax holiday and a reduction to 12.5% for 
those in rural areas. 
7. Allow for exemption from payment of withholding tax on dividends and other 
payments made to residents in Kenya. 
8. Fast track transformation of EPZs into Special Economic Zones. 
9. Increase efficiency of port operations. 
10. Encourage the government to provide stimulus to help EPZ firms address the 
challenges of the global economic recession. 
11. Urge the government to lobby the US for permanent AGOA agreement as well as 
an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the European Union (EU). 
All of the recommendations, apart from subsidizing electricity rates, fall within a neo-
classical economic framework. The recommendations emphasize the need to reduce 
transaction costs for producers, lower taxes, and ease international trade, all of which are 
central components to market-led export oriented industrialization policies as discussed 
in Chapter 1. The recommendations, if implemented, may provide some relief for EPZ 
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firms by reducing their costs and making them more competitive with Asian 
manufacturers. However, the recommendations fail to address the fundamental long-term 
problems facing the manufacturing industry. There are several questions that remain 
unanswered. For example, will reducing taxes on EPZ firms mean that they will reinvest 
their profits in Kenya to make their operations more productive? Or will profits continue 
to be repatriated out of the country? Will allowing EPZ firms to sell more of their product 
on the domestic market strengthen all Kenyan manufacturers? Or will EPZ firms drive 
non-EPZ firms out of the market? Will trade agreements with the US and EU improve 
Kenya's balance of trade? Or will it allow more non-Kenyan manufactured goods to be 
imported cheaply at the expense of domestic manufacturers? 
There is an implicit assumption by the EPZA, and by extension the Government 
of Kenya, that what is good for EPZ firms is necessarily good for Kenyan manufacturing 
as a whole. However, the EPZ program is detached from a comprehensive 
industrialization strategy that addresses the fundamental weaknesses of the Kenyan 
manufacturing sector; this is becoming apparent as tensions increase between KAM and 
the EPZA. 
The recommendations from the EPZA seek to deepen processes of economic 
liberalization in the belief that previous economic liberalization has not gone far enough 
to foster a competitive manufacturing sector and attract foreign investment. The plan 
outlined for the manufacturing sector in Vision 2030 provides evidence of the ongoing 
commitment to economic liberalization. 
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Vision 2030 calls for the development of industrial and manufacturing zones in 
different parts of the country. The different activities in these zones would consist of 
meat processing/tannery operations, agro-processing, tea and coffee packaging for export, 
horticulture, and fish processing (Ministry of Planning and National Development 2007: 
64). The government plans to fund the infrastructural development of these zones through 
investments in ports, roads, rail, and utilities. The government also plans to offer 
financial incentives to foreign firms investing in SEZs. Initially, "A pilot site [SEZ] will 
be set up in Mombasa to allow for easy importation of necessary raw materials and 
exporting of finished goods" (Ibid.: 64). In addition to the SEZs, the government also 
plans on developing five small and medium enterprise industrial parks in key urban 
centres by investing in infrastructure and services to make them attractive for investors 
(Ibid.: 64). 
The overall plan for the manufacturing sector, as detailed in Vision 2030, consists 
of three strategies. The first strategy is to strengthen local production by defending local 
industries from counterfeit and dumped goods as well as increasing their productivity; the 
specific goal is to reduce imports in key local industries by 25% (Ibid.: 63). The second 
strategy is to expand the regional market by developing special economic clusters and 
improving regional collaboration; the specific goal is to increase regional market share 
from 7% to 15% (Ibid.: 63). The third strategy is to increase exports to the global market 
through development of SEZs and negotiating more trade agreements; the specific goal is 
to attract at least 10 large strategic investors in key agro-processing industries (Ibid.: 63). 
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The specific goals outlined in the plan for local, regional, and global industries, if 
met, would strengthen the manufacturing sector. However, the strategies for reaching 
these goals are similar to the strategies used in the EPZ program which has so far failed 
to have a significant impact on improving Kenya's overall manufacturing performance. 
For example, the government built infrastructure to support EPZ development, generous 
financial incentives were given to foreign firms, and Kenya secured a trade agreement 
with the US through AGO A, but the program failed to transform Kenya's manufacturing 
sector. It is unlikely that using the same strategy will produce vastly different results in 
Kenya's current economic development plan. 
Conclusion 
This chapter presented data on three different aspects of the EPZ program: the 
contribution of EPZ exports to overall exports; linkages between domestic firms and EPZ 
firms; and employment creation and the casualization of labour in EPZs. 
The data showed that the contribution of EPZ exports to overall exports is 
declining, and EPZ firms have failed to significantly diversify into higher value added 
manufacturing; the majority of exports are made up of textile products. EPZ textile firms 
are also closing as they are less able to compete with cheaper Asian producers after the 
expiration of the MFA. 
The data also showed that linkages between domestic firms and EPZ firms remain 
weak and local manufacturers face the threat of losing market share to EPZ firms if they 
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are allowed to sell more of their product on the domestic market at lower cost because of 
generous government tax incentives and other subsidies. 
Finally, employment in EPZs is decreasing, wage rates have not kept pace with 
inflation, and the use of casual employment is widespread. The decline in real wages 
means that workers are less able to afford basic necessities as consumer prices increase 
and it also means that workers are contributing less to domestic demand for locally made 
products. The increased use of casual labour is preventing workers from unionizing and it 
also prevents them from securing full-time permanent employment with greater benefits. 
The findings in the data suggest that EPZs have failed to meet their core 
objectives of increased and more diversified manufactured exports; increased linkages 




The purpose of this thesis was to determine the extent to which Kenyan EPZs 
were contributing to industrialization and development. It is a timely issue because 
countries throughout SSA and throughout the developing world are developing EPZs, or 
some variation of them, to stimulate their manufacturing sector. 
The thesis statement argued that the Kenyan EPZ program would fail to achieve 
its stated objectives because it left little room for the state to take an active role in 
industrial policy and promote domestic capital. This was based on the findings in the 
literature review which suggested that EPZs were too detached from a national industrial 
strategy because it prioritized foreign capital over domestic capital and few restrictions or 
regulations were put in place on foreign capital to ensure that domestic development 
objectives were met. 
The theoretical discussion in the literature review showed that mainstream 
development theory has embraced a neo-classical economics approach to 
industrialization which prioritizes market-led policies over state-led policies in the belief 
that they are more efficient and necessary for transforming the industrial sector in 
developing countries. However, many of the industrial successes in the NICs were due to 
state interventionist policies that protected and invested in domestic industries. 
The discussion of Kenya's industrial policies showed that despite the success of 
state intervention in the industrial development of the NICs, Kenya abandoned many of 
its state-led industrialization policies in favour of liberalized markets and an emphasis on 
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lowering transaction costs in an effort to attract FDI. Many of the reforms in the 
industrial sector were a result of external pressure, in the form of threats to withhold 
financial aid, from IFIs and donor countries. The transition from state-led 
industrialization in Kenya to market-let industrialization approaches did little to stimulate 
the industrial sector and there was little growth in the sector in relation to the rest of the 
economy from the 1970s to the present. 
The case study of EPZs showed that the EPZ program in Kenya has failed to 
transform the industrial sector and meet the objectives of the program as stated by the 
government. There has been little diversification into higher value production in EPZs; 
there have been few backward linkages with domestic firms; there has been little 
sustained increase in job creation, and the wages earned by local employees in the EPZs 
have failed to keep pace with inflation. 
The data from the findings shows that the EPZ program is failing to meet its 
objectives and is not able to transform Kenya's industrial sector. 
From a broader development perspective, the failure of the EPZ program suggests 
that a neo-classical economics approach to industrialization in developing countries is 
ineffective in meeting broader development objectives of becoming more economically 
self-sufficient by manufacturing a greater number of products locally whereby profits 
stay within the local economy and are able to be re-invested. Neoliberalism, has taken the 
place of colonialism by enforcing a system of trade in which Kenyan raw commodities 
(tea, coffee, cut flowers) or low level manufactures (textiles and apparel) can be shipped 
cheaply from Kenya. Conversely, barrier free trade allows more developed countries to 
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sell manufactured products on local markets at a price that prevents local manufacturers 
from developing and providing Kenyan made products to the domestic and regional 
markets. The data on exports and imports shows this trend becoming more pronounced as 
the trade deficit increases; the value of imported manufactured goods is growing far more 
quickly than the value of export commodities. 
The failure of the EPZ program to meet its stated objectives should give policy 
makers a reason to rethink Kenya's economic development strategy with regard to 
industrialization. However, broader policy discussion, involving state intervention in the 
manufacturing sector, will likely meet resistance from the World Bank, the WTO, and 
donor countries. These external forces have placed tremendous pressure on the 
government of Kenya, by withholding financial support, in return for liberalized markets 
and privatization of state-owned enterprises in the 1990s, and they continue to pressure 
Kenya to continue liberalization reforms through trade agreements like AGOA and 
PRSPs (see Chapter 2). The current plan for the manufacturing sector, as outlined in the 
previous chapter, does not appear to significantly depart from the neo-classical economic 
theory underpinning the EPZ program. In Kenya's recent economic development plans 
there is still a firm commitment by the government to private investment in 
manufacturing and increased liberalization of the market; the government believes that its 
role should be limited to investing in key infrastructural products to ease the flow of 
goods to the market and providing a competitive environment for private investors 
through tax incentives and a stable and efficient regulatory regime. However, there is 
little consideration of a more active role of the state through tariffs, subsidies, state-
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owned enterprises, or other forms of industry protection to stimulate the sector. 
Considering the disappointing performance of Kenya's manufacturing sector to date, and 
continued reliance on raw commodities for exports, the policy discussion should be 
broadened to consider more active state intervention. 
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